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Friedmann: Bright Line, Dim Prospects: Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group,

BRIGHT LINE, DIM PROSPECTS: GRUPO DATAFLUX V.
A TLAS GLOBAL GROUP, L.P.I REAFFIRMS A BRIGHT
LINE BARRIER TO DIVERSITY JURISDICTION FOR
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS AND OTHER
UNINCORPORATED ENTITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, a defendant limited partnership removed its suit to federal
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and prevailed on the merits.2
On appeal, the Third Circuit panel requested sua sponte a list from the
partnership of the citizenship of all of its partners and learned that one of
the partners was a partnership itself with nondiverse members as of the
time of filing and removal.
The court noted that the nondiverse
members left the partnership before trial commenced and deemed the
parties to be completely diverse on the basis of that unilateral "cure,"
hinging its rationale for not vacating judgment on judicial economy
grounds.4
In 2004, a fractured Supreme Court reversed a Fifth Circuit
decision that held that a plaintiff limited partnership cured defective
diversity jurisdiction when nondiverse members left the partnership
before trial commenced. 5 In the intervening fifteen years, the Court
made two key policy pronouncements in the area of diversity jurisdiction
that were relevant to this case: 1) in Carden v. Arkoma Associates, the
Court resolved a circuit split regarding how to determine citizenship of
unincorporated business associations such as limited partnerships,6 2) in
Caterpillarv. Lewis, the Court announced in broad language that judicial

1. 541 U.S. 567 (2004).
2. Knop v. McMahan, 872 F.2d 1132, 1137 (3d Cir. 1989), reh 'g and reh 'g en banc denied
May 17, 1989 (allowing a partnership composition change to cure a nondiverse partnership after
time of filing).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1139.
5. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 581-82 (labeling the Fifth Circuit decision as creating a new exception
to time of filing precedent).
6. 494 U.S. 185 (1990).
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economy concerns are adequate justification for allowing federal courts
to retain diversity cases that violated the complete diversity rule at the
time of filing but subsequently satisfied complete diversity before time
of judgment.
This Note examines how these two policy decisions changed the
landscape of diversity jurisdiction for limited partnerships and other
unincorporated entities. 8 It argues that, despite the Grupo majority's
expressed rationale of adhering to time of filing precedent, a rule that
requires complete diversity between parties to exist at the time of filing,
the majority actually reaffirmed and clarified the scope of the
Caterpillar exception to the time of filing rule. 9 This Note further
argues that the real impetus for the majority's decision was the fear that
any tinkering with the bright-line rule of Carden, which requires courts
to count the citizenship of all members of a limited partnership toward
the partnership's citizenship for diversity, would undermine the Court's
effort to pressure Congress into abolishing or severely curtailing
diversity jurisdiction.10 Part II of this Note introduces the origins of
diversity jurisdiction, how citizenship is determined for purposes of
diversity, the time of filing rule and its exception, and the debate over
diversity jurisdiction." Part III presents the facts, procedural history,
and majority and dissenting opinions in the Grupo decision.' 2 Part IV
analyzes the Court's reasoning and argues that the unincorporated
association precedents were controlling to the case rather than the time
of filing precedents, and discusses the practical effects of retaining
Carden's bright line and arbitrary rule.' 3 Finally, Part V concludes that
Congress should legislatively
reform this unfair rule or the Court should
14
use its power to do so.

7. 519 U.S. 61 (1996).
8. See supranotes 6-7 and accompanying text for explanation of these policy decisions.
9. See infra notes 40-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the time of filing rule and
its exception.
10. See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the debate over diversity
jurisdiction. See infra note 129 (discussing the proposition that the judiciary is committed to
eliminating or severely curtailing diversity jurisdiction). See infra notes 32-39 for background on
Carden.

11.

See infra notes 15-76 and accompanying text.

12.

See infra notes 77-123 and accompanying text.

13. See infra notes 124-87 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Origins ofDiversity Jurisdiction

1. Constitutional Origins
Federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction that is
strictly delineated by the Constitution and federal statutes. 15 Article III §
1 vested the Supreme Court with the "Judicial Power of the United
States" and vested Congress with the power to create the lower federal
courts.' 6 Article III § 2 established the limited array of "controversies"
over which the federal courts may have jurisdiction.1 7 One of these
enumerated subject matters was diversity jurisdiction, or, state law cases
"between Citizens of different States... and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects."1 8
Commentators generally agree that one of the Framers' underlying
rationales for providing a federal forum for diverse parties was a concern
about bias against out-of-state litigants.1 9 This constitutional form of
15. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.1, at 260 (4th ed. 2003) ("A
federal court may adjudicate a case only if there is both constitutional and statutory authority for
federal jurisdiction."); David Porter, "Incorporating"Limited PartnershipsInto FederalDiversity
Jurisdiction:Correcting Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 287, 287 (1990)
(opining that "[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction."); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (opining that federal courts "possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute"). Subject matter jurisdiction is "j]urisdiction over the
nature of the case and the type of relief sought." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 857 (7th ed. 1999).
16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. (granting jurisdiction over a wide array of subject matter
including cases "arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made").
Article III also grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over cases regarding ambassadors or
where a state is a party but only grants appellate jurisdiction for all other types of controversies
enumerated in Article III. Id.
18. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2).
19. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 5.3, at 289 (noting that out-of-state bias was one of the
rationales for providing diversity jurisdiction); 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER &
EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3605, at 398 (2d ed. 1984) ("The
presumed theory behind the original grant of diversity jurisdiction in Article III was to provide a
neutral, national forum for cases in which there would be a danger of bias in a state court against an
out-of-state litigant."). See generally Porter, supra note 15, at 292 n.35 (providing an in-depth look
at the constitutional debates surrounding the inception of diversity jurisdiction (citing Henry J.
Friendly, The HistoricBasis of Diversity Jurisdiction,41 HARV. L. REV. 483 (1928))). See Henry J.
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 483-95 (1928)
(indicating that the idea for diversity jurisdiction arose from the Virginia Plan and noting that in
addition to bias another rationale for diversity was out-of-state creditors' concerns that state
legislatures would favor in-state debtors).
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diversity jurisdiction is known as "minimal diversity" because the text of
the Constitution requires nothing more than that "any two adverse
parties are not co-citizens.,, 20 But because Article III vests Congress
with the power to create the lower federal courts, Congress also holds
the power to statutorily limit the federal courts from exercising the full
extent of subject matter jurisdiction granted in Article III, § 2.21
2. Statutory Origins
Congress first exercised its power to create and control the lower
federal judiciary when it passed the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789.22 In
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, the Supreme Court departed from Article III
"minimal diversity" when Justice Marshall's opinion interpreted the
Judiciary Act's diversity provision to require "complete diversity"
between multiple party litigants.2 3 The complete diversity interpretation
20. See State Farm, 386 U.S. at 530 (describing minimal diversity as "diversity of citizenship
between two or more claimants, without regard to the circumstance that other rival claimants may
be cocitizens [sic]").
21. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 5.1, at 260 n.2. citing Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441
(1850). See Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 449 ("Congress may withhold from any court of its creation
jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute can have no
jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.").
22. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, at 289. See The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73
(1789) (creating the first district and circuit federal courts, establishing the organizational structure
of the Supreme Court, and authorizing some of the elements of subject matter jurisdiction
enumerated in Article III, §2, including diversity jurisdiction). The Act stated in pertinent part:
And be it further enacted, That the circuit courts shall have original cognizance,
concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common
law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or
value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an
alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and
a citizen of another State.
The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789) (emphasis in original). See generally
Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV.
49 (1923) (providing detailed documentation of the debates leading to the passage of the Act) cited
in Porter, supranote 15 at 292 n.35.
23. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806), overruled in part by Louisville, Cincinnati
& Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 (1844) and superseded by statute, Act of March 3, 1875,
ch. 137, §2, 18 Stat. 470, 470-71 ("The court understands these expressions to mean that each
distinct interest should be represented by persons, all of whom are entitled to sue, or may be sued, in
the federal courts."). This concept became known as "complete diversity." See Owen Equipment &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978) (explaining that complete diversity means every
defendant's citizenship differs from every plaintiffs). In Strawbridge, a number of Massachusetts
plaintiffs brought suit in federal court under the diversity statute against a number of defendants, all
but one of whom were Massachusetts citizens. Friendly, supra note 19, at 508-09. Justice Marshall
later regretted limiting the federal diversity statute to parties with complete diversity. Id.; WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 19, § 3605, at 398-400 (citing Louisville, C. & C. R. Co. v. Letson,
43 U.S. 497, 555 (1844) ("It is within the knowledge of several of us, that he repeatedly expressed
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remains intact despite numerous Congressional re-enactments and
amendments of the federal diversity statutes.24 The modem version of
the federal diversity statute is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332.25
Because § 1332 is the default rule for federal diversity jurisdiction,
the complete diversity interpretation announced by Justice Marshall
applies to original filings based on diversity as well as most, but not all,
other rules of procedure that involve diversity.2 6
27

B. How is CitizenshipDetermined?

The state citizenship of individual parties for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction is determined by looking to that individual's domicile.2 8 An
individual's domicile is the "place of 'his true, fixed, and permanent

regret that those decisions had been made, adding, whenever the subject was mentioned, that if the
point of jurisdiction was an original one, the conclusion would be different.")); CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 15, § 5.3, at 295 (same).
24. See Owen, 437 U.S. at 373 (explaining that despite numerous re-enactments and
amendments, Congress has never discarded the complete diversity interpretation even though it is
not Constitutionally required); State Farm, 386 U.S. at 531 (noting "Chief Justice Marshall there
purported to construe only '[t]he words of the act of congress,' not the Constitution itself").
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1996). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and
is between (1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and citizens and subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens or subjects
thereof are additional parties...
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1996). The monetary requirement, or, "amount in controversy" survives from
the original Judiciary Act and has steadily increased from the original $500 to $10,000 in 1958,
$50,000 in 1988, and finally to the present amount of $75,000 in 1996. CHEMERINSKY, supra note
15, § 5.3, at 304. When parties bring a case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, the
federal court applies the state law pertaining to the underlying controversy. Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.").
26. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 19, § 3605, at 404 (explaining that one
exception to the complete diversity requirement is 28 U.S.C. § 1335, the federal interpleader statute,
which requires only minimal diversity); State Farm, 386 U.S. at 530 (explaining that the courts
uniformly interpret the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1335 requiring "[tiwo or more adverse claimants, of
diverse citizenship," as requiring only minimal diversity among parties).
27. Discussion of every possible type of "citizenship" for purposes of diversity jurisdiction is
beyond the scope of this note. This note limits discussion of the topic to the three types of entities
involved in the case: individuals, corporations, and unassociated businesses, specifically limited
partnerships. For a broader overview of citizenship for purposes of diversity, see CHEMERINSKY,
supranote 15, § 5.3, at 296-99; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, § 3606.
28. Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 842 (1974)
(explaining that State citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction requires both U.S. citizenship
and domicile in the State in question).
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home and principal establishment, and to which he has the intention of
returning whenever he is absent therefrom [sic]"' and can only be
changed by moving to a residence in a new State with the intent to
remain there.29
The state citizenship of corporations for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction is codified under the general diversity statute at 28 U.S.C. §
1332(c)(1) which provides in pertinent part:
[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it
has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place
of business .... 30

Unlike the doctrine of complete diversity, which derived from
judicial interpretation of a legislative act (the Judiciary Act of 1789), the
practice of treating a corporation as an entity with state citizenship
distinct from its members derived from case law that Congress
subsequently codified.3'
29. Id. (quoting Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954)). See also Mitchell v.
United States, 88 U.S. 350, 353 (1874) (explaining that absence from a prior residence is
insufficient to establish new domicile without the requisite intent to remain at the new residence).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1996). A corporation is "[a]n entity (usually a business) having
authority under law to act as a single person distinct from the shareholders who own it and having
rights to issue stock and exist indefinitely ... has a legal personality distinct from the natural
persons who make it up." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 341 (7th ed. 1999).
31. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 5.3, at 297. See Louisville, C. & C. R. Co. v. Letson, 43
U.S. 497, 558 (1844) ("[A] corporation created by and doing business in a particular state, is to be
deemed to all intents and purposes as a person, although an artificial person, an inhabitant of the
same state, for the purposes of its incorporation, capable of being treated as a citizen of that state, as
much as a natural person."). Letson reversed the Court's earlier rule, established in Bank of United
States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 91-92 (1809), which held that the court must consider all individuals
composing a corporation (holding that the court would "look to the character of the individuals who
compose the corporation" to determine its citizenship). In Letson the Court criticized the Deveaux
rule. Letson, 43 U.S. at 555 (stating that Deveaux was criticized by the bar and by the Court).
Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to add section (c) in 1958. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-554, 72 Stat. 415 ("[A] corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been
incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business."); See James William
Moore & Donald T. Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction:Past, Present,and Future, 43 TEx. L. REV.
1, 12 (1964) (explaining that by expanding corporate citizenship to any State where incorporated
and to the principal place of business, Congress substantially limited the judicially-created corporate
diversity doctrine which had granted diversity access to federal courts as long as a corporation was
incorporated in the state in which the suit was brought) cited in Porter, supra note 15, at 292 n.35.
Congress took this action because corporations were using the broad grant of citizenship to forum
shop. See Peter B. Oh, A JurisdictionalApproach to Collapsing Corporate Distinctions, 55
RUTGERS L. REv. 389, 460 n.320 (2003) quoting S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 3101-02 (1958), as
reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101-02 (stating that the reason Congress wished to narrow
corporate citizenship was to prevent "the evil whereby a local institution, engaged in a local
business and in many cases locally owned, is enabled to bring its litigation into the Federal courts
simply because it has obtained a corporate charter from another state").
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Congress failed to codify the state citizenship of limited
partnerships, a form of unincorporated business entity, for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction and judicial treatment varied wildly until 1990.32
In Carden v. Arkoma Associates, the Supreme Court resolved the
inconsistency among circuits and held that for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction, courts must consider the citizenship of all members of an
unincorporated business association.33
In Carden, an Arizona limited partnership brought a contract suit
against citizens of Louisiana in federal court.34 The defendants filed a
motion to dismiss and alleged that one of Arkoma's limited partners was
a citizen of Louisiana, but the court denied the motion.3 5 After a verdict
for the partnership, the Fifth Circuit only considered the general
partners' citizenship for purposes of diversity and held that complete
diversity existed between the parties.36
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court majority examined its
precedent and reasoned that after the Court created citizenship status for
corporations in Letson, in subsequent cases it refused to extend the same
citizenship status for unincorporated entities such as limited
partnerships.3 7 The dissent argued in favor of adopting a "real parties to
32. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 19, at § 3630, 682-84 (2d ed. 1984)
(explaining that courts frequently split over whether limited partners' citizenship should be
considered in addition to general partners); John McCormack, Comment, Carden v. Arkoma
Associates: The Citizenship of Limited Partnerships, Associations, and Juridical Entities - A
Chilling Future for Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 27 NEw ENG. L. REv. 505, 509 (1992)
(explaining that prior to 1990, the Second and Fifth Circuits only considered general partners'
citizenship while the Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits considered all member partners'
citizenship to determine diversity). See also LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS
ENTITIES, 292 (2d. ed. 2000) ("A limited partnership has general partners whose rights and duties
are mostly subject to the general partnership statute, as well as limited partners who have limited
liability and whose rights and obligations are governed by statutory provisions that are primarily
aimed at protecting creditors."); 3 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND

RIBSTEN ON PARTNERSHIPS § 12.01, at 12:5-12:6 (1999) (explaining that limited partners tend to be
passive suppliers of capital analogous to shareholders in a corporation).
33. Carden, 494 U.S. at 194. This analysis of member citizenship must extend to each level
of an unincorporated association, i.e., if a limited partnership (L1) has another limited partnership
(L2) as a member, one must examine the citizenship of all the members of L2 and count them
against the citizenship of Ll. See, e.g., Meyerson v. Harrah's East Chicago Casino, 299 F.3d 616,
617 (7th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (vacating and remanding because the parties failed to allege the
citizenships of the defendant unincorporated business).
34. Carden, 494 U.S. at 186.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 189 (citing Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 457 (1900)
(holding that a limited partnership did not fall under the citizenship rule for corporations and "that
rule must not be extended")). See also Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 681 (1889) (holding that
a New York joint-stock company was actually a partnership, and therefore was not a citizen of New
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the controversy" test that would determine which partners to count for
purposes of diversity according to which partners "have control over the
subject of and litigation over the controversy. 38 But the majority
refused 39to jump ahead of the legislature as it had previously done in

Letson.

C. When is Citizenship Determined?
1. General Rule: Time of Filing
In 1824, the Supreme Court established the general rule that "the
jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the state of things at the time of
the action brought, and that after vesting, it cannot be ousted by
subsequent events. ' 4° Unlike Justice Marshall's creation of the complete
diversity doctrine, which derived from statutory interpretation, the time
of filing doctrine did not derive from a statute but from judicial policymaking. 4' The time of filing rule may actually work to protect a
diversity action in situations where complete diversity existed at the time
of filing but a party subsequently changes citizenship and the parties are
no longer diverse.42 The policy supporting a "bright line" time of filing
rule is''43
that it provides "stability and certainty to the viability of the

action.

York because it was not a corporation); Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 153
(1965) (deferring to the legislature the question of whether an unincorporated labor union should be
granted corporate status for purposes of diversity); See also supra note 32 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Letson.
38. Carden,494 U.S. at 198 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 196-97 (majority opinion) (noting that Congress passed up one opportunity to
extend citizen status to limited partnerships and other unincorporated associations when it amended
28 U.S.C. § 1332 to extend citizen status to corporations). Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
opined that Congress failed to act despite the fact that "the existence of many new, post-Letson
forms of commercial enterprises... must have been obvious." Id. Justice Scalia acknowledged that
the majority's position was "technical, precedent-bound, and unresponsive to policy considerations
raised by the changing realities of business organizations." Id.
40. Mullen v. Torrance, 22 U.S. 537, 539 (1824); accord Anderson v. Watt, 138 U.S. 694,
702-03 (1891) ("And the [jurisdictional] inquiry is determined by the condition of the parties at the
commencement of the suit.").
41. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 19, § 3608, at 452 (2d ed. 1984) (explaining
that the time of filing rule was a policy decision).
42. Id. at n.l.1 (citing Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. KN Energy Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991)
(holding that diversity jurisdiction was maintained in a case where a non-diverse party was joined
after time of filing)). See also Wichita & Light Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n of the State of Kansas,
260 U.S. 48, 54 (1922) ("Jurisdiction once acquired on that ground is not divested by a subsequent
change in the citizenship of the parties.").
43. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 19, § 3608, at 452 (2d ed. 1984) (explaining that
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2. Exception for Curing Diversity After the Time of Filing
In a recent line of cases, the Supreme Court applied an exception to
the time of filing rule to protect a diversity action in situations where
complete diversity did not exist at the time of filing but subsequent
events cured the problem."
a. Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain
Newman-Green, an Illinois corporation, sued a number of
Venezuelan defendants and a United States citizen domiciled in
Venezuela and alleged diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332
(a)(3).45 Because the United States citizen domiciled in Venezuela
lacked a domicile in a state, he was considered "stateless" and therefore
spoiled diversity under 28 U.S.C. 1332 (a)(3). 46 After partial summary
judgment for both parties, Newman-Green appealed and the Seventh
Circuit panel granted Newman-Green's motion to drop the nondomiciled U.S. citizen as a dispensable party under FED. R. CIv. P. 21,
which worked to perfect complete diversity.47 However, the Court of
Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed the panel's decision and held that Rule
21 did not apply to courts of appeals.4 8 The Supreme Court reversed that
decision and held that the power granted by FED. R. CIV. P. 21 to district
courts to dismiss dispensable non-diverse parties applied equally to
courts of appeals. 49 The majority opined that policy considerations
supported using this diversity curing method because "requiring
dismissal after years of litigation would impose unnecessary and
wasteful burdens on the parties, judges, and other litigants waiting for
this "uniform test" prevents courts from having the burden to track citizenship of parties throughout
an action).
44. See infra notes 45-68 and accompanying text.
45. Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 828 (1989). See 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(a)(3) (conferring diversity jurisdiction in civil actions between "citizens of different States and in
which foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof are additional parties").
46. Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 828 (citing Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646 (1878)
(explaining that a U.S. citizen's State citizenship under the diversity statute is that State in which
that citizen is domiciled)).
47. Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 829.
48. Id. at 830.
49. Id.at 833. See FED. R. Civ. P. 21 ("Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court
on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are
just."). Before Newman-Green reached the Supreme Court, some circuits held that appellate courts
must remand to district courts the decision to use Rule 21. Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 830.
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judicial attention." 50

The two dissenting justices were troubled that FED. R. CIV. P. 21
did not grant explicit power to circuit courts to dismiss dispensable
parties. 5 1 But the majority stated that "practicalities weigh[ed] heavily"
in favor of the grant of dismissal and instructed circuit courts to apply
52
the doctrine sparingly and examine whether prejudice would ensue.
b. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis
In Caterpillar, Lewis, a Kentucky citizen, filed a state personal
injury claim in Kentucky state court against Caterpillar, a Delaware
bulldozer manufacturing corporation with a principal place of business
in Illinois, and Whayne Supply, a Kentucky bulldozer servicing
corporation with a principal place of business in Kentucky. 53 A
Massachusetts based insurer subsequently intervened as a plaintiff to
assert subrogation claims.5 4 After Lewis settled his claim against
Whayne, Caterpillar filed notice of removal to federal court under 28
U.S.C. § 1441 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.55 Lewis filed a
motion to remand back to state court and alleged that because Whayne
was still a party as to the insurer, complete diversity did not exist. 56 The
district court denied Lewis' motion to remand and Whayne subsequently
settled its claim with the
insurer and was dismissed from the action
57
before trial commenced.
On appeal from a verdict for Caterpillar, the Sixth Circuit held that
the district court's denial of Lewis' motion to remand was error and
50. Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 836.
51. Id.at 840 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy was joined by Justice Scalia. Id.
52. Id. at 837 (majority opinion). The majority felt that dismissing the case at that point after
judgment forced parties to go through "judicial hoops for the sake of hypertechnical jurisdictional

purity." Id.
53. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1996).
54. Id.at 65.
55. Id.The requirements for removal of a case from state to federal court as a diversity action
are as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought

in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction,
may be removed by the defendant or defendants ...
(b) ...Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1441.

56. Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 65. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ("If at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded.").
57. Caterpillar,519 U.S. at 66.
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vacated the judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.5 8 The
Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg,
agreed with the Sixth Circuit that the district court should have granted
the motion to remand, but held that "overriding considerations" existed
because complete diversity existed between the parties at the time of
judgment.59
The Court held that the policies announced in Newman-Green were
"instructive" despite the fact that the case did not involve a removal
scenario, because both cases involved defective diversity that was cured
prior to judgment. 60 Justice Ginsburg stated the exception to the time of
filing rule as follows: "Once a diversity case has been tried in federal
court, with rules of decision supplied by state law under the regime of
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins... considerations of finality, efficiency, and
economy become overwhelming. 6 1 The Court downplayed Lewis'
argument that the decision would encourage non-diverse defendants to
remove prematurely and predicted that defendants would not risk a lack
62
of complete diversity being discovered prior to judgment.
c. Post-Caterpillar cases
Most lower courts that considered the effect of Caterpillarbefore
the Court heard Grupo did not distinguish the applicability of its judicial
economy exception on the basis of the procedural method used to bring a
diversity action to federal court.6 3 However, in Saadeh v. Farouki,the
58. Id.
59. Id.at 75.
60. Id.at 76. "Beyond question, as Lewis acknowledges, there was in this case complete
diversity, and therefore federal subject matter jurisdiction, at the time of trial and judgment." Id. at
73.
61. Id. at 75. The Court was influenced by two earlier removal cases, American Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951), and Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp, 405 U.S. 699
(1972).
Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 70 ("[E]ach suggests that the existence of subject-matter
jurisdiction at time of judgment may shield a judgment against later jurisdictional attack."). In Finn
the Court stated,
There are cases which uphold judgments in the district courts even though there was no
right to removal. In those cases the federal trial court would have had original
jurisdiction of the controversy had it been brought in the federal court in the posture it
had at the time of the actual trial of the cause or of the entry of the judgment.
341 U.S. at 16. In Grubbs, the Court relied on this language from Finn to allow a judgment in an
improperly removed case to stand. 405 U.S. at 705.
62. Caterpillar,519 U.S. at 77 ("The well-advised defendant, we are satisfied, will foresee
the likely outcome of an unwarranted removal - a swift and non-reviewable remand order.").
63. Most lower courts distinguished Caterpillar on the ground that a case had not reached
judgment before the defect in diversity was raised. See, e.g., Vasura v. Acands, 84 F. Supp. 2d 531,
537 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (distinguishing Caterpillarbecause the defect to diversity was discovered
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D.C. Circuit declined to extend the Caterpillar judicial economy
exception to the time of filing rule in a diversity action originally filed in
federal court. 64 At the time of filing in that breach of contract case, there
were aliens on both sides of the action in violation of 28 U.S.C. §
1332.65 After Saadeh filed the complaint, Farouki became a U.S. citizen,
the parties entered a stipulation to dismiss the other defendants under
FED. R. CIV. P. 21, and the bench trial resulted in a judgment for
Saadeh.66 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit raised the jurisdictional issue on
its own and held that the use of FED. R. Civ. P. 21 to dismiss the other
alien parties cured those defects to diversity in accord with NewmanGreen.67 But the court held that Farouki's post-filing change of
citizenship did not cure the defect in diversity as to his citizenship and
that the Caterpillarexception was not applicable because it arose in the
removal context. 8
D. The Future of Diversity Jurisdiction
The original justification for diversity jurisdiction, a concern for
prejudice based on state citizenship, has given way to contemporary
debate in the past forty years over the continuing usefulness of diversity
jurisdiction.6 9 In 1969, the American Law Institute completed a study of
the federal and state court systems and concluded that diversity
jurisdiction continued "to serve an important function in our federal
system., 70 A bill to abolish diversity jurisdiction passed the House but
prior to judgment); Ferry v. Bekum Am. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1289 (M.D. Fla. 2002)
(same); Soriano v. Amvac Chemical Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11437, at *4 (E.D. Louis. Jun.
23, 2003) (same).
64. Saadeh v. Farouki, 107 F.3d 52, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
65. Id. at 53 (finding that Saadeh, the plaintiff, was a citizen of Greece, two defendants were
permanent residents of Maryland with citizenship in Jordan and Egypt respectively, and one
defendant corporation held citizenship in the United Kingdom and Monaco). Another defendant
was a corporation with citizenship in the District of Columbia. Id. The District of Columbia is
considered a "state" under the diversity statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
66. Saadeh, 107 F.3d at 54.
67. Id. at 56. See supra note 49 (explaining that FED. R. Civ. P. 21 permits dismissal of
dispensable non-diverse parties); Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 832 (granting circuit courts the
authority to use FED. R. Civ. P. 21 directly rather than remand to district courts).
68. Saadeh, 107 F.3d at 57 ("Although we are mindful of the 'considerations of finality,
efficiency and economy' that concerned the Supreme Court in Caterpillar,those concerns in the
removal context are insufficient to warrant a departure here from the bright-line rule that citizenship
and domicile must be determined as of the time a complaint is filed.").
69. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 19, § 3601, at 345 ("For at least the last 40
years the desirability of diversity jurisdiction has stirred continuing debate in the law reviews and in
the halls of Congress.").
70.

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
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died in the Senate in 1978. 71 Opponents concede that since that effort,
Congressional reforms have been modest and primarily achieved
through periodic increases in the amount-in-controversy.7 2 In 1990, the
Federal Courts Study Committee recommended abolishing diversity
jurisdiction except for complex, multi-state actions, interpleader, and
alienage jurisdiction.73 The primary argument of opponents of diversity
jurisdiction is the necessity to decrease the federal courts' caseload.7 4
AND FEDERAL COURTS, 1 (1969), cited in CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15 at 293. ALl commenced
the study in response to a request during a 1959 address to the institute by Chief Justice Earl
Warren. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 70 at ix. Warren noted "the constant upward trend
in the total volume" of the federal caseload and interest in Congress in limiting or abolishing
diversity jurisdiction. Id.
71. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 5.3, at 290 (citing H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., (2d Sess.
1978)).
72. See Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 97 (1990) cited in Charles
A. Szypszak, Jural Entities, Real Parties in Controversy and Representative Litigants: A Unified
Approach to the DiversityJurisdictionRequirementsfor Business Organizations,44 ME. L. REV. 1,
I n. I (1992) (noting Kramer as an opponent of diversity jurisdiction). See Kramer, supra note 72, at
102 (citing Congress' increasing the amount in controversy, adding principal place of business to a
corporation's citizenship (in 1958), and allowing diversity-based removal only for out-of-state
defendants); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 5.3, at 294 (citing Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 205, 110 Stat. 3847 (1996) (raising the amount in controversy to
$75,000 in 1996)). Kramer argues that Congress' failure to take significant action is because of
significant lobbying by trial lawyers and the American Bar Association. Kramer, supra note 72, at
98-99.
73. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 5.3, at 291 citing THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 38-39 (1990).

In 1988,

Congress created this fifteen member Committee within the Judicial Conference of the United
States with passage of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
102 Stat. 4642 (1988), and authorized the Chief Justice to appoint its members. THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE at 31. The Committee argued that alienage jurisdiction and the other
two exception arenas had special characteristics worthy of a federal forum. Id. at 40. As a "back-up
proposal" for incremental reform, the Committee recommended: banning diversity jurisdiction for
in-state plaintiffs, modifying corporate citizenship to include states where licensed to do business,
banning non-economic damages (such as pain and suffering) from satisfying the amount-incontroversy, and raising and indexing the amount from $50,000 to $75,000. Id. at 42.
74. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 5.3, at 291. See also Kramer, supra note 72, at 99
(recommending that Congress alleviate caseloads of federal judges by abolishing or significantly
curtailing diversity jurisdiction because diversity cases comprise approximately 25% of district
court civil dockets and 10 to 14% of appellate dockets). He argues that statistics show the increase
on state courts dockets would amount to a little over one-percent across states. Id. at 110. Kramer
additionally argues that state courts have more expertise and authority to handle state law questions
and state law decisions made by federal judges sitting in diversity have limited precedential value.
Id. at 104. He also argues there is less pressure to improve and reform state judiciaries because of
diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 106. Kramer, a University of Chicago law professor and former law
clerk to Henry Friendly, was one of the fifteen members of the Federal Courts Study Committee.
THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supranote 73, at 197. See also Friendly, supra note 19
(considered a "seminal" work in the area of diversity jurisdiction). See also THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 73, at 5 (arguing that between 1958 and 1988 cases filed in the
federal district courts tripled and in the federal circuit courts increased tenfold, requiring drastic
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In addition to the historical concern about bias against out-of-state
litigants, contemporary proponents of diversity jurisdiction argue that it
provides a choice of forum and uniformity of rules for complex
litigation.75 Proponents additionally argue that the law advances76more
quickly because two separate court systems provide interpretation.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement ofFacts
Atlas Global Group, L.P. ("Atlas"), a Texas-based limited
partnership, filed a state law breach of contract claim against Grupo
77
court.
Dataflux ("Dataflux"), a Mexican corporation, in federal district

Atlas based the allegation of subject matter jurisdiction solely on
diversity jurisdiction.7 8 At the time of filing, Atlas' membership
reforms).
75. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 5.3, at 292. But see Kramer, supra note 72, at 106
(attacking the continuing importance of the historical justifications for diversity by arguing that
interstate commerce is well established and does not need protection). Additionally, he notes that
two major arguments in favor of maintaining diversity - the impression that federal courts provide
better quality justice than state courts and the concern for bias against out-of-state litigants - are
difficult to measure quantitatively. Id.at 118. Three members of the fifteen member Federal Courts
Study Committee, Senator Charles E. Grassley of Iowa, Morris Harrell, past ABA President and
partner of a Dallas law firm, and Diana Gribbon Motz, partner of a Baltimore law firm, dissented
from the Committee's recommendation to abolish diversity jurisdiction as well as to the back-up
proposal to modify corporate citizenship. THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note
73, at 42. Harrell and Motz's joint dissent argued that "the availability of the alternative federal
forum is often an important element ofjustice well worth its minor costs." Id. at 43.
76. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 5.3, at 291 (citing John P. Frank, The Casefor Diversity
Jurisdiction, 16 HARV. J. on LEGIS. 403 (1979)). See also John P. Frank, The Case for Diversity
Jurisdiction, 16 HARV. J. on LEGIS. 403,409 (1979), supra note 76 (arguing that the federal and state
systems cross-pollinate improvements to procedural rules through diversity jurisdiction). Harrell
and Motz's joint dissent to the Federal Courts Study Committee recommendation to abolish
diversity agreed with this argument. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supranote 73, at 43.
77. Atlas Global Group, L.P. v. Grupo Dataflux, 312 F.3d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 541
U.S. 567 (2004). The Texas-formed Atlas limited partnership specializes in equity placements,
financial advice and consultation. Brief of Appellants at 2, Atlas Global Group, L.P., v. Grupo
Dataflux, 312 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-20245), 2001 WL 34633472. See TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1 § 1.02(6) (Vernon 2004) (describing a Texas limited partnership as "a
partnership formed by two or more persons under the laws of Texas and having one or more general
partners and one or more limited partners). Dataflux, a microcomputer wholesale distributor,
entered a contract with Atlas to privately place stock. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at ii, Grupo,
541 U.S. 567 (No. 02-1689) 2009 WL 22428073 (explaining that Dataflux's correct name is
Dataflux, S.A. de C.V.). Grupo Dataflux is the parent company and Dataflux and Atlas stipulated to
the use of "Grupo Dataflux" for the purposes of the litigation. Id.
78. Atlas, 312 F.3d at 170. Atlas alleged diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(2) which
provides jurisdiction for cases between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state
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included one Texas limited liability company, one Delaware corporation,
one Texas limited partnership, and two Mexican citizens. 7 9 Because
under Carden courts consider the citizenship of each member of a
limited partnership when determining whether complete diversity exists,
attributed to the Atlas
the Mexican members' citizenship was
partnership, therefore Mexican citizens were parties on both sides of the
as required by 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(2),
controversy and complete diversity,
80
did not exist at the time of filing.
But the two Mexican citizens left the Atlas partnership before trial
commenced. 8' Neither the magistrate nor Dataflux questioned the
existence of diversity between Atlas and Dataflux during the six-day
jury trial. 82 However, prior to entry of judgment on the verdict for Atlas,
Dataflux submitted a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.83 Dataflux argued that Carden required the court to count
the citizenship of the Mexican citizens in its determination of whether
diversity existed between Atlas and Dataflux. 84 They argued that the
presence of the Mexican citizens at the time of filing the lawsuit violated
the common law requirement that federal jurisdiction "depends upon the
state of things at the time of the action brought....
Even though the Mexican partners left Atlas before trial began, the
magistrate held that the Fifth Circuit's decision in Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Hillman required that citizenship determinations for
Brief of Appellants, supranote 77, at 3.
79. Id. Interestingly, in December 1998 Dataflux moved to add Oscar Robles-Canon and
Francisco Llamosa, the two Mexican partners of Atlas, as additional parties to its counter-claim
against Atlas. Brief of Appellants, supra note 77, at 4. The court granted Dataflux's motion. Id.
80. Atlas, 312 F.3d at 170; see Carden, 494 U.S. at 194 (holding that the Court must look to
the citizenship of all the members of a limited partnership for determining diversity). See
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. at 267 (interpreting the Judiciary Act of 1789 to require complete
diversity rather than Article III's lesser requirement of minimal diversity).
81. Atlas, 312 F.3d at 170. In April 2000, Robles and Llamosa left the Atlas partnership and
this change became final as of September 2000, one month before trial commenced in October
2000. Brief of Appellants, supra note 77, at 7. As of time of trial, the Atlas partnership consisted
of: 1) HIL Financial Holdings, L.P., a Texas limited partnership composed of a Texas corporation
with a principal place of business in Texas and a Delaware corporation with a principal place of
business in Texas and 2) Capital Financial Partners, Inc., a Delaware corporation with a principal
place of business in Texas. Id.By the time of trial, Atlas' citizenship under Carden included Texas
and Delaware, while Dataflux's citizenship remained Mexican. Id.
82. Atlas, 312 F.3d at 170. The jury awarded Atlas a $750,000 verdict. Id.
83. Id. See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(h) (3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the
action.").
84. Atlas, 312 F.3dat 170.
85. Id. See Mullen, 22 U.S. at 539 (delineating the time of filing rule for diversity
jurisdiction).
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diversity purposes control as of the time of filing, and under Carden, the
Mexican partners' citizenship spoiled diversity between Atlas and
Dataflux as of the time of filing. 86 The district court held that the parties
lacked complete diversity and granted Dataflux's motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.8 7
B. The Court ofAppealsfor the Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court in a two-to-one
decision.88 The majority held that while the time of filing rule is the
general rule, the exception to the time of filing rule announced in
Caterpillar and guided by the practical judicial economy rationale of
Newman-Green applied to this case. 89 Although Dataflux argued that
the D.C. Circuit's refusal in Saadeh to apply Caterpillarto an original
filing case was persuasive, the Fifth Circuit held that the Supreme Court
did not limit the Caterpillarexception to one particular diversity curing
procedure and that its judicial economy rationale applied to an original
filing case such as Atlas.90 The Fifth Circuit also refused to distinguish
Newman-Green on the basis of its use of FED. R. CIV. P. 21 to cure the
diversity problem via court-ordered dismissal. 9 1 Additionally, the
majority refused to distinguish Caterpillar and Newman-Green from
Atlas just because in the former cases judgment was entered whereas in
the instant case, a verdict was reached but the motion to dismiss was
granted before judgment was entered. 92 The majority held that this
exception to the time of filing rule applied when:
(1) an action is filed or removed when constitutional and/or statutory
86. Atlas Global Group v. Grupo Dataflux, No. H-97-3779 at 1 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2000)
(memorandum and order granting Dataflux's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction). See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Hillman, 796 F.2d 770, 776 (5th Cir. 1986) ("At
the commencement of this suit, there was not complete diversity of citizenship and the federal
district court had no subject matter jurisdiction. If a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it
must dismiss the action.").
87. Atlas, No. H-97-3779 at 2. The court dismissed without prejudice and ordered the statute
of limitations stayed from November 1997 until December 2000. Id.
88. Atlas, 312 F.3d at 174. Judge Carl E. Stewart was joined by Judge Benavides in the
majority opinion.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 173-74 (refusing to consider Saadeh controlling, "because Saadeh does not provide
any analytical justification for its conclusion that removal cases deserve differential treatment, we
find it unpersuasive").
91. Id. (opining that in the absence of express language from the Supreme Court limiting
diversity cures to removal cases and Rule 21 dismissals the argument was unpersuasive).
92. Id. at 173 (stating that "[ilt is difficult to distinguish a case where judgment has been
entered from a case where nothing is left for the court to do other than enter judgment").
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jurisdictional requirements are not met, (2) neither the parties nor the
judge raise the error until after a jury verdict has been rendered, or a
dispositive ruling has been made by the court, and (3) before the
verdict93 is rendered, or ruling is issued, the jurisdictional defect is
cured.

The majority called this a "narrow" exception because it only
applied if the court did not discover the cured defect before a verdict or
dispositive ruling. 94 Thus, the court found that the judicial economy
rationale underpinning Caterpillarand Newman-Green provided strong

support for applying the exception to this case, because the district court
had jurisdiction over the case during both trial and at the time of the
verdict and because "ample resources" had been committed on all sides
to trying the case all the way to verdict. 95
Judge Garza, writing in dissent, argued that under the time of filing
rule, the case "should be easy" because under Carden, Atlas had
Mexican citizenship and, therefore, lacked diversity from Dataflux. 96 He
argued that Atlas' partnership change before trial was analogous to a
non-diverse individual filing suit and then moving out of state before
trial commenced. 97 Judge Garza argued that the majority carved out a
new and broader exception to the time of filing rule because Atlas'
method of curing diversity was to unilaterally change its citizenship,
whereas in Caterpillarthe court maintained control over the method of
98
curing diversity by dismissing the non-diverse party.

93. Id. at 174. The court opined that it would be unlikely that this exception would encourage
parties to knowingly file with defective diversity because of the risk that if the defect was
discovered by the court or by the opponent before verdict or ruling the general time of filing rule
would apply. Atlas, 312 F.3d at 174.
94. Id. The court believed that by limiting the exception only to post-verdict discovery of
defective diversity, it would minimize the possibility that parties would knowingly file suit with
defective diversity and risk application of the general time of filing rule. Id.
95. Id. (arguing that "full assessment of the evidence by an impartial jury during a six-day
trial" weighed against forcing the parties to re-litigate in either state or federal court).
96. Id. at 174-75 (Garza, J., dissenting).
97. Id. (comparing the facts of Atlas with Sarmiento v. Texas Bd Of Veterinary Med
Examiners where the Fifth Circuit held that an individual's post-filing move out of state did not cure
defective diversity). See Sarmiento, 939 F.2d 1242, 1246 n.6 (5th Cir. 1991), superseded by statute,
Act of Dec. 1, 1990, P.L. 101-650, Title III § 310(c), 104 Stat. 5114.
98. Atlas, 312 F.3d at 176-77 (Garza, J., dissenting). Judge Garza argued that the majority
carved out a new exception because in this case, Atlas had sole control over the action that cured
diversity. Id. He distinguished this scenario where Atlas used its power to alter its partnership
composition to remove the diversity spoiling partners from that of Caterpillarwhere "Caterpillar
had no control over whether Whayne supply remained in the case." Id. While he did not question
Atlas' good faith, Judge Garza argued that allowing parties to have sole control over the method of
curing diversity would open the door for "less scrupulous" parties. Id.
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Judge Garza also attacked the policy rationale for the Caterpillar
exception embraced by the majority and argued that abandoning the time
of filing rule for determining diversity would do little to promote judicial
99
economy when most resources are expended during pre-trial discovery.
Even if this case arguably fell within the Caterpillarexception, Judge
Garza argued that the concern for preservation of "ample resources"
based on the point at which a court rendered a verdict or ruling as
opposed to the time of filing was not convincing because "there is no
difference in efficiency terms between the jury verdict and, for example,
the moment at which the jury retires."' 0 0 Finally, Judge Garza opined
that adhering to bright-line rules that served to limit the federal courts'
jurisdiction is vital to preserving the balance between federal and state
court systems. 10 1 Despite Judge Garza's misgivings, the court reversed
and instructed the district court to enter judgment for Atlas. 0 2 After the
Fifth Circuit rejected Dataflux's petition for 03
rehearing en banc, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 1
C. The UnitedStates Supreme Court
1. Majority Opinion
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth
Circuit.' °4 Justice Scalia, 10 5 writing for the majority, reaffirmed the
Court's commitment to the general rule established in Mullen of
determining diversity jurisdiction as of the time of filing "regardless of
the costs it imposes.' 1 6 The majority agreed with Judge Garza that the
99. Id. at 177. (opining that creating more exceptions to bright-line rules undermines judicial
economy because it causes more litigants to challenge the boundaries of the exceptions).
100. Id. at 177 (continuing that "[n]or, for that matter, is there a large difference between the
verdict and mid-way through the trial").
101. Atlas, 312 F.3d at 177-78 (Garza, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "waste" of judicial
resources that results any time a federal court dismisses a case for lack of jurisdiction is worth the
"price" of federalism).
102. Id. at 174 (majority opinion).
103. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, 540 U.S. 944 (2003) (granting petition for writ of
certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit). In support of its petition for
certiorari, Dataflux argued that the Fifth Circuit created a new exception distinct from Caterpillar.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supranote 77, at iii-iv. Dataflux distinguished Caterpillaras limited
to removal cases and pointed to the D.C. Circuit Saadeh decision as indicative of this limitation. Id.
at 8-11. Further, Dataflux argued that principles of federalism overrode any judicial economy to be
preserved by allowing an exception in this instance. Id. at 18.
104. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 582 (2004).
105. Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Justice Scalia. Id. at 568.
106. Id. at 570-71 (arguing that the time of filing rule is "hombook law"). The general rule of
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Fifth Circuit's exception was distinguishable from Caterpillarbased on
the method used to cure diversity; the method used in Caterpillar,
used to
dismissal, was different from the method the Atlas10partnership
7
cure diversity, changing its partnership composition.
The majority argued that under Carden, Atlas' post-filing
membership change was analogous to a single individual moving to
another state during litigation to unilaterally cure diversity by altering its
citizenship.10 8 The majority held that the Court had never approved an
exception to the time of filing rule based on a party's unilateral change
to its citizenship, thus the cure in Atlas was distinct from the cure in
Caterpillarand violated precedent.' 09
After attacking the Fifth Circuit exception as breaking with time of
filing precedent, the majority further argued that justifying such an
exception on a judicial economy grounds alone "would create an
exception of indeterminate scope." 1 0 Additionally, the majority argued
looking at the citizenship of the parties from the time suit was filed applies regardless of how late
into the litigation a challenge to jurisdiction is brought. Id. (citing Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S.
126 (1804) (stating that challenges to subject matter jurisdiction are viable until final judgment)).
107. Id.at 572 (arguing that the Court in Caterpillar"broke no new ground" when it viewed
the diversity problem in that case as cured because cure by dismissal "had long been an exception to
the time of filing rule"). While judicial economy "unquestionably provided the ratio decidendi in
Caterpillar," the Court did not intend to extend that exception beyond the well-established
procedural cure of dismissal. Id. at 572. Ratio decidendi is Latin for "the reason for deciding."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (7th ed. 1999). The majority noted that the Court's power to
dismiss dispensable parties was first recognized in Horn v. Lockhart and is now "well settled" under
Rule 21. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 572-73. See Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U.S. 570 (1873) (holding that the
Court may cure defective diversity by dismissing dispensable non-diverse parties). Recall that the
Court recognized the courts of appeals' power to use Rule 21 in Newman-Green. See supra notes
46-53 for a discussion of that case. The majority argued that the parties to the case in Caterpillar
and Newman-Green changed after the courts involved dismissed the diversity spoilers, but in Atlas,
the parties never changed, because under Carden, the partnership entity itself is the party rather than
the member partners. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 579-80.
108. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 575 (arguing that when Atlas dropped the Mexican partners from its
partnership it changed its citizenship rather than changing the parties to the litigation). The majority
acknowledged that for purposes of diversity determinations the courts examines the "aggregation"
of a limited partnership's members but opined that "we think it evident that Carden decisively
adopted an understanding of the limited partnership as an "entity," rather than an "aggregation," for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction." Id. at 579 n.8. The majority refused to acknowledge that there
was even minimal diversity between Atlas and Dataflux at the time of filing. Id. at 579.
109. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 574 (citing Conolly v. Taylor, 27 U.S. 556 (1829) (explaining that
"[wihere there is no change of party, a jurisdiction depending on the condition of the party is
governed by that condition, as it was at the commencement of the suit")). The majority reasoned
that Atlas violated this principle because the partnership remained a party to the case, only a change
in its internal citizenship occurred because the Court could not use Rule 21 to dismiss partners from
the partnership. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 574-75. The majority stated that it knew of no deviation from
Conolly's requirement that the parties' citizenship status be evaluated as of the time of filing. Id.
110. Id. at 576 (arguing that the Fifth Circuit's attempt to limit the exception to situations
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that because in its view the Fifth Circuit created a new exception distinct
from Caterpillar,judicial economy would actually be undermined rather
than enhanced because it would result in a rise in collateral jurisdictional
challenges.11 1
2. Dissenting Opinion
Writing for the dissent, Justice Ginsburg' 1 2 agreed that the general
rule established in Mullen that requires diversity between parties at the
time of filing "generally, is altogether sound," but argued that the
majority narrowed the Caterpillar exception further than the
Constitution and the federal diversity statute required. 11 3 The judicial
economy-based exception derived from Caterpillarand Newman-Green
transcends any distinction between an originally-filed and a removed
case because the purpose of curing diversity in both situations is to
perfect statutory diversity, as occurred in the case at bar when the

where nobody raised the defect in diversity until verdict or dispositive ruling was "unsound in
principle" and would be ignored by practitioners). If a court discovered before a verdict or
dispositive ruling that a defect in diversity existed at the time of filing (the line drawn by the Fifth
Circuit) it would be "unsound in principle" for a court to dismiss just because of when the defect
becomes known if in fact the defect has been cured. Id. The majority opined that the "artificial
limitation" drawn by the Fifth Circuit would be "discarded in practice" because of the realities of
the diversity litigation environment. Id. Drawing on diversity litigation statistics from 2003 the
majority noted that only eight-percent of diversity cases went to trial and the median time to
disposition was two years. Id. The majority agreed with Judge Garza's opinion that limiting the
curing exception to scenarios where the defect was not detected until after verdict or dispositive
ruling would not promote efficiency. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 574.
111. Id. at 580-81 (arguing that the purpose of the time of filing rule, to prevent constant relitigation of jurisdiction as parties' circumstances change, is thwarted by new exceptions). The
majority viewed the risk of opening the floodgates as greater because of the "expandable" efficiency
rationale that grounded the exception. Id. at 581. The majority saw this case in particular as a
prime example of wasted efficiency. Id. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the Caterpillar
exception, Atlas spent 3 2 years litigating jurisdiction rather than re-litigating the merits or
negotiating for a settlement with Dataflux. Id. The majority believed that if Atlas re-filed the case
the parties would settle quickly rather than "play the hand all the way through just for the sake of
the game." Id.
112. Justice Ginsburg authored the unanimous opinion in Caterpillar. In Grupo she was joined
by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 582. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 599 (opining that the Court must re-examine and adjust its precedents when
needed). Because the time of filing rule was a court-created policy the court has the power to adjust
and adapt the policy. Id. at 583. The dissent analyzed precedent and concluded that while the Court
applied the time of filing rule consistently in cases where a post-filing change would destroy
diversity, the Court applied the time of filing rule inconsistently in cases where a post-filing change
could cure diversity. Id. Rather, in the most recent Supreme Court case to address Caterpillarthe
Court held that "untimely compliance" with the statutory requirement of complete diversity was
allowable. Id. at 1932 citing Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 43.
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Mexican partners left Atlas.14
The dissent conceded that the Caterpillar exception would not
allow a single individual to move post-filing in order to cure diversity
but argued that Atlas' partnership composition change was not
analogous to that scenario)' 5 Rather, the dissent categorized a partial
membership change of a "multimember enterprise" as analogous to
multi-party litigation where some parties drop out. 116 Examining
Carden, the dissent concluded that although that precedent requires
courts to count the citizenship of each member of a limited partnership
toward that partnership's citizenship, it did not follow that minimal
diversity would not exist if only some partners are non-diverse from the
other party. 1 7 The dissent harmonized Caterpillarand Newman-Green
with this case through this minimal diversity theory. 1 8 It viewed a
limited partnership's ability to have minimal diversity at the time of
114. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 591-92 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (pointing out that removal
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 requires the same statutory diversity found in § 1332 that Atlas
failed to satisfy at the time of filing). The dissent argued that it would not be logical to tolerate
flawed diversity in removal cases but not in original filing cases when "[r]emoval jurisdiction, after
all, is totally dependent on satisfaction of the requirements for original jurisdiction." Id. Regardless
of the route the litigation takes to federal court, counsel and the court must be aware of
jurisdictional requirements. Id. at 593.
115. Id. at 590 (agreeing with the majority that the rule of Conolly controls when a sole
plaintiff tries to "manufacture" diversity after filing by moving to another state). The dissent
reasoned that this rule is sound because there is no way for a non-diverse, individual party to have
Article III minimal diversity at the time of filing, rather there is simply no diversity at all. Id.
However, the dissent distinguished Conolly from this case by characterizing Grupo as one of first
impression regarding how the time of filing rule applied to a multi-member association that is
viewed as an "aggregate" of its members to determine its citizenship. Id. at 591 n.6.
116. Id. at 591 (agreeing with the majority that the key to their disagreement was over how to
characterize Atlas' membership change). The dissent saw the majority's characterization of Atlas'
membership change as a change in the entity's citizenship as a "far-from-inevitable alignment."
Grupo, 541 U.S. at 592 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). When procedural decisions are not clear cut, as
the dissent alleged in this case, "salvage operations are ordinarily preferable to the wrecking ball."
Id.
117. Id. at 589-90 (arguing that the Carden majority's admonition to Congress to decide via
legislation which unincorporated entities should be given "citizenship" status for diversity purposes
indicates that minimal diversity is possible). The dissent argued that if minimal diversity were not
possible, Congress would be constitutionally prohibited from drafting legislation to treat limited
partnerships like corporations for diversity purposes. Id. "Congress would be disarmed from making
such determinations. .. if Article III itself commanded that each partner's citizenship...
inescapably adheres to the partnership entity." Id. at 589.
118. Id. at 588, quoting State Farm, 386 U.S. at 531 ("Article III poses no obstacle to the
legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse parties
are not co-citizens."). The dissent called out the majority's recognition that in both Caterpillarand
Newman-Green minimal diversity existed at the time of filing. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 588 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). The common thread between all three cases was the existence of minimal diversity
and absence of complete diversity as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 at the time of filing, and the
curing of that flaw later in the proceedings. Id. at 588-89.
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filing and create complete diversity when non-diverse partners leave the
partnership as the distinguishing factor from a non-diverse individual
citizen who moves out of state to create complete diversity." 9 The
dissent saw room within the Carden precedent to apply the Caterpillar
exception if a limited partnership had minimal diversity at the time of
filing and a subsequent 20change in membership created complete
diversity before judgment. 1
After countering the majority's precedent arguments, the dissent
addressed the majority's argument that limiting the application of the
judicial economy exception to fully adjudicated cases was unsound and
argued that this limit made the exception manageable. 12 1 The dissent
also disagreed about the judicial economy concerns of this case and
argued that allowing the exception to apply under these facts was even
22 Justice Ginsburg argued
more compelling than in Caterpillar.1
that
because the judge-created time of filing rule's underlying rationale is
judicial economy, "mechanical
extension" of the general rule in this case
23
thwarted that justification.1

119. Id. (arguing that the inability of a non-diverse individual to have minimal diversity at the
time of filing distinguishes that scenario). The partners who left the partnership did not move to
perfect diversity, rather, they dropped out. Id. at 591. The dissent saw dropping partners as
analogous to "a change in parties to the action." Id.
120. Id. at 591 n.7 (opining that the majority's focus on the partnership as an "entity" was
"hardly preordained"). The dissent argued that if both the "aggregate" and the "entity"
characterization were supportable, "Caterpillarand Newman-Green suggest that the one preserving
the adjudication ought to hold sway." Grupo, 541 U.S. at 591 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 594 n.9 (arguing that given the statistics about diversity filings the limit may be
"underinclusive" but was not "illogical"). The dissent conceded that there were judicial economy
concerns in cases that never concluded in trial or dispositive ruling but argued that limiting the
exception to those cases that do fully adjudicate make the exception manageable. Id. The "sunk
costs" are clear in a fully adjudicated case and are "overwhelming," justifying the application of the
exception. Id. The dissent characterized the majority's concern for sparking litigation from a new
exception as "imaginary" and argued that the exception would rarely be used. Id.at 597.
122. Id. at 597-98 (noting that unlike Lewis, the loser in Caterpillar,who made his motion to
remand while diversity was still flawed, Dataflux, the loser in this case, failed to make a motion to
dismiss until after Atlas cured diversity). The dissent also noted that Caterpillar removed the nondiverse case to federal court "precipitously", within one day of the statute of limitations for removal
whereas Atlas filed in federal court timely to the events giving rise to the suit. Id. The dissent
portrayed the majority's decision as giving Dataflux "an unmerited second chance." Grupo, 541
U.S. at 598 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
123. Id.at 594 n.9. Justice Ginsburg felt that requiring Atlas, now completely diverse from
Dataflux, to refile and "go through the motions" was unnecessary and required "merely for the sake
of hyper technical jurisdictional purity." Id.at 595 n.10 quoting Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 837.
The dissent felt that it was not a forgone conclusion that the parties would simply settle given both
sides willingness to litigate to this point. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 595-96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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IV. ANALYSIS

The majority cited the long established time of filing rule as its
principal rationale for holding that Atlas failed to cure the defect in
diversity by rearranging its partnership composition.' 24 But this case
required the Court to mingle precedent involving the time of filing rule
and its Caterpillarexception with Carden, which adopted the bright-line
25
rule regarding citizenship of unincorporated business associations.'
Each of these lines of precedent that were key to the Court's decision in
Grupo are "subconstitutional" doctrines, i.e. the Court developed the
time of filing rule, its exceptions, and the bright-line partnership
citizenship rules as policy decisions rather than by interpreting a
Congressionally-mandated jurisdictional statute (such as 28 U.S.C. §
1332) or specific text in the Constitution. 26 Because these are Courtdeveloped, subconstitutional doctrines, one must look beyond majority
and dissent's differing analytical approaches (in this case strict versus
flexible adherence to precedent) to find the Court's underlying policy
rationale for the decision.127 This section of the Note examines those
analytical approaches and argues that the majority used arguments based
on honoring time of filing precedent and a preference for judicial control
28
not to attack or weaken Caterpillar,but rather to maintain Carden.'
The decision in this case really boiled down to the majority's refusal to
open up the bright-line rule of Carden to any exceptions because it
serves as a line in the sand to Congress regarding the further expansion
124. id. at 1924 (majority opinion) ("[w]e have adhered to the time-of-filing rule regardless of
the costs it imposes.").
125. See supra notes 32-68 and accompanying text for background information about the time
of filing rule, Carden, and Caterpillar.
126. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 590 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (arguing that Article III mandates neither
the Court's bright-line decision in Carden nor the narrow interpretation of the time of filing rule and
the Caterpillar exception in this case, rather, "the question here is plainly subconstitutional in
character"). Marshall's opinion in Mullen establishing the time of filing rule did not derive the rule
from statute or from the Constitution. Id. at 583 (noting that while the "complete diversity" rule
developed from an interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1789, commentators agree that the time of
filing rule was a Court-based policy decision). Compare supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the origins of the "complete diversity" requirement with supra notes 40-43 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the origins of the time of filing requirement. Grupo. 541 U.S.
at 578 (arguing that "[w]hether the Constitution requires it or not, Carden is the subconstitutional
rule by which we determine the citizenship of a partnership..."). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 n.234 (1987) (discussing from the context of
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence the Court's "subconstitutional" rulings as those that "could be
trumped by legislative enactment").
127. See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text discussing Justices Scalia and Ginsburg's
typical analytical approaches in the subject matter jurisdiction arena.
128. See infra notes 131-48 and accompanying text.
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of diversity jurisdiction. 129 The outcome of this case has both positive
and negative implications for future litigants: the Court's clarification of
the Caterpillar exception to the time of filing rule is a positive
development for multi-party litigants, but its stubborn commitment to
the rule of Carden for unincorporated associations continues to cause
grief for such entities and often completely30 bars their access to federal
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 1
A. Clear Time of FilingPrecedentor Carden?
In Grupo, Justice Scalia justified the majority's decision by arguing
in favor of adherence to tradition and a desire to maintain judicial
control of parties at the expense of judicial economy and practicalities.'13
Although the majority hinged its decision on the perceived clarity of the
time of filing precedent, the close split in this decision indicates that the

129. See infra notes 171-87 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 69-76 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the continuing debate over diversity jurisdiction.
Commentators' accounts of events preceding significant statutory curtailments to diversity
jurisdiction support the proposition that the judiciary is a driving force behind the effort to curtail
diversity jurisdiction. See Leading Cases: FederalJurisdictionand Procedure, 118 HARV. L. REV.
386 n.68 (2004) (henceforth "Leading Cases") (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is "a prosaic statute
amended primarily to increase the amount in controversy requirement"); Amy L. Levinson,
Developments in the Law: Federal Jurisdictionand Forum Selection. Developments in Diversity
Jurisdiction, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1407, n.9 (2004) (opining that while Congress periodically
increases the amount in controversy in order to alleviate the federal caseload, the legislature has
actually expanded diversity jurisdiction in some arenas as recently as 2002). Levinson notes that
Congress enacted Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction in 2002 for accidents in which more than
seventy-five persons died. Id. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1369, Congress only requires minimal diversity.
Id. Timothy J. Yuncker, Inactive Corporations and Diversity Jurisdiction Under 28 US.C.
1332(C): The Search for a PrincipalPlace of Business, 28 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 815, 821 n. 31
(1997) (indicating that the effort to amend 1332(c) to add principal place of business to corporate
citizenship and limit corporate access to diversity jurisdiction was instigated by the judiciary). The
recommendation for such amendment stemmed from a study initiated by the Judicial Conference of
the United States and passed on to Congress. Id. William A. Braverman, Janus was not a God of
Justice: Realignment of Parties in Diversity Jurisdiction, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1072, 1092 (1993)
("Although Congress has been willing to regulate diversity jurisdiction at the margins, by
periodically raising the amount-in-controversy and by defining corporate citizenship, it has resisted
attempts to eliminate diversity jurisdiction altogether."). Braverman points out of the reforms
recommended by the 1990 Federal Courts Study Committee, Congress refused to adopt any of the
Committee's reforms except to raise the amount-in-controversy to $75,000 in 1996. Id. See also
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITrEE, supra note 73.
130. See infra notes 149-87 and accompanying text.
131. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 582 (arguing in favor of the "stability" guaranteed by the "time-tested"
time of filing rule and against exceptions that "impair the certainty of our jurisdictional rules and
thereby encourage similar jurisdictional litigation"). In addition to attacking the value of judicial
economy, Justice Scalia expressed concern about allowing cures to jurisdiction that do not require
judicial intervention. Id. at 580.
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32
Court's historical allegiance to the general rule is not crystal clear.'
One commentator who analyzed Justice Scalia's opinions argues that he
frequently relies on arguments grounded in tradition and precedent in the
area of subject matter jurisdiction to maintain limited jurisdiction. 3 3 In
contrast, a study of Justice Ginsburg's opinions found that her concern
with efficiency leads her to work around general rules when
necessary. 134 The Justices' debate in this case over how to interpret
Anderson v. Watt supports these authors' propositions.' 35 In Anderson,
after co-executors of an estate sued, the Court determined that one coexecutor shared citizenship with a defendant. 36 The nondiverse coexecutor attempted to revoke his executorship and withdraw from the
case but the Court, citing Conolly, analogized the situation to a single
party moving after time of filing to perfect diversity and dismissed the
case. 137 Justice Ginsburg argued that Anderson was an antiquated
anomaly to the Court's Caterpillar exception and used the case to

132. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 584 (J. Ginsburg, dissenting) (arguing that while the Supreme Court
consistently applies the time of filing rule when a post-filing citizenship change would destroy
diversity, "[i]n contrast, the Court has not adhered to a similarly steady rule for post-filing party
line-up alterations that perfect previously defective statutory subject-matter jurisdiction"). See id,
comparing, e.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1993) (dismissing and
refusing to find an exception to the time of filing rule to excuse a defect in jurisdiction when the
plaintiff had a similar suit pending in another court at the time of filing) with Lexecon, Inc. v.
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hyes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 43 (1998) (explaining that Caterpillartaught
that "untimely compliance" with federal jurisdictional requirements before judgment is entered in a
case may excuse the underlying error). But see Grupo, 541 U.S. at 575 n.5 (arguing for the majority
that none of the cases cited by the dissent involved a post-filing citizenship change, which is how
the majority categorized Atlas's membership change).
133. Daniel Capra, Discretion Must be Controlled, Judicial Authority Circumscribed,
Federalism Preserved, Plain Meaning Enforced, and Everything Must Be Simplified: Recent
Supreme Court Contributions to Federal Civil Practice, 50 MD. L. REv. 632, 633 (1991). Capra
argued that Scalia's majority opinion in Carden illustrated his "philosophy of strict adherence to
tradition," to further his goal of limiting judicial activism Id. at 653-54. Capra concluded that
under this style of analysis, "[i]t will be the rare case where a traditional rule of procedure will be
rejected, even if it is admittedly outmoded." Id.
134. Elijah Yip & Eric K. Yamamoto, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's Jurisprudence of
Process and Procedure, 20 HAWAII L. REV. 647, 655-56 (1998). Yip and Yamamoto argue that
Justice Ginsburg is cognizant of the federal caseload crisis and the need to alleviate it. Id.
Additionally, her judicial record indicates she takes stare decisis seriously and only grudgingly
deviates from precedent. Id. at 659. However, as demonstrated by her opinion in Caterpillar,
Justice Ginsburg is willing to work around general rules of precedent to maintain court efficiency.
Id. at 656.
135. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 571 (using Anderson to demonstrate how much "waste" the Court
would tolerate in order to maintain the time of filing rule). Justice Scalia noted that the Court in
Anderson upheld the time of filing rule even though four years had passed since the Court's decree
to sell land and the land in fact had been sold. Id.
136. Anderson v. Watt, 138 U.S. 694, 708 (1891).
137. Id.
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support her argument in favor of viewing the Atlas partnership in this
case as an aggregate capable of minimal diversity in order to salvage the
judgment.138 On the other hand, Justice Scalia drew on his practice of
favoring strict interpretation of precedent and argued that Anderson was
not anomalous when one viewed the co-executors as an entity. 139 This
debate illustrates that despite Justice Scalia's insistence that the decision
in Grupo rested on a strict adherence to the time of filing precedent, the
precedent-based arguments were not used to attack the Caterpillar
exception but rather to attack Justice40 Ginsburg's willingness to open the
Carden precedent up to a loophole.'
Additionally, the majority's argument that judicial control is
mandatory to affect a diversity cure erroneously equated any unilateral
cure with a unilateral citizenship change. 14' But courts have approved
non-judicial methods of curing diversity in addition to judge-controlled
dismissal of nondiverse parties under FED. R. CIV. P. 21.142 Thus,
138. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 578 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg deemed the
Anderson decision as "not altogether in tune" with Caterpillarand Newman-Green and viewed the
co-executors, as she viewed the Atlas partners, as aggregates capable of individually dropping out
of the lawsuit. Id.
139. Id. at 572 n.3. (majority opinion). Justice Scalia saw the case as "easily harmonized" with
Caterpillarand Newman-Green if one viewed the co-executors as an entity, as he did the Atlas
partnership, and not as independent, severable parties. Id. The close vote in Grupo supports the
proposition that these were two equally plausible interpretations.
140. See Leading Cases, supra note 129, at 386 (opining that the Court in Grupo failed to
overrule Caterpillar). See also Taylor Simpson-Wood, Has the Seductive Siren of Judicial
Frugality Ceased to Sing?: Dataflux and its Family Tree, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 281, 343 (2005)
(opining that Justice Scalia analyzed Anderson "as a companion piece to Carden."). See infra, notes
171-87 discussing Carden.
141. Justice Scalia called it a "curious anomaly" that if the Court treated a change in partners
like a change in parties, no judicial action would be required to cure diversity and asserted that "[i]t
would produce a case unlike any other case. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 580. See also Leading Cases,
supra note 129, at 390 (opining that the majority in Grupo thwarted the dissent's attempt to go
beyond a "judges-only" rule of curing diversity defects). The author states that "because the
majority rebuffed an exception to the time of filing rule premised on changing citizenship, the only
alternative - dismissal - affirms judicial power." Id.at 390 n.42.
142. See Knop, 872 F.2d at 1138 (allowing a partnership composition change to cure a
nondiverse partnership after time of filing). After the defendant partnership removed to federal
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, the court requested, sua sponte, a list from the
partnership of the citizenship of all of its partners and learned that one of the partners was a
partnership itself with nondiverse members as of the time of filing and removal. Id.at 1137. Note
that while this case was decided pre-Carden, the court applied the same test of citizenship of
counting all members of the partnership. Id. The court noted that the nondiverse members left the
partnership before trial commenced and deemed the parties to be completely diverse on the basis of
that unilateral "cure." Id. at 1138. The court hinged its rationale in judicial economy principles and
stated that they grounded exceptions in Grubbs and Finn, cases also relied upon by the Caterpillar
court. Id.at 1138-39. See also, Scheinblum v. Lauderdale County Bd. of Supervisors, 350 F. Supp.
2d 743 (2004) (allowing voluntary dismissal of a nondiverse party under FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a) to
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judicial control over the method of curing is not mandatory and
unilateral cure is not a "curious anomaly." 143 Rather, the majority's
erroneous equation of unilateral cure with unilateral citizenship change
was a tool used to bolster their argument that there was no room for an
aggregate point of view under Carden.144
Finally, Justice Scalia's argument to discount the value of judicial
economy in this case is undermined by his vote with the unanimous
Court in Caterpillar,which hinged the exception to the time of filing
rule wholeheartedly on judicial economy. 145 There are commentators
and judges who devalue a judicial economy rationale for expanding a
federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of a strict
1 46
allegiance to the principles of federalism and separation of powers.
But Justice Scalia acknowleged that the rationale for the application of
an exception to the time of filing rule in Caterpillar,a decision he
joined, was judicial economy. 147 These erroneous justifications for the
Grupo decision based on strictly interpreting time of filing precedent,
cure a lack of complete diversity at the time of filing). The court noted that Rule 41(a) does not
require any action by the court but is a unilateral action by parties to effect dismissal. Id.at 746 n.3
quoting 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 41.21 [4] (2004):
Because Rule 41(a) permits dismissal of particular parties, a dispensable nondiverse
party may be dismissed to preserve the court's diversity jurisdiction. The same result
may be reached by dropping a party under Rule 21 or by amending the complaint to
delete the nondiverse party under Rule 15(a). Which of these procedural mechanisms is
employed to preserve jurisdiction is generally immaterial.
Id.
143. See Grupo, 541 U.S. at 593 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that while "a court's
attention may be attracted to the jurisdictional question by a motion to remand a removed case or a
motion to drop a party" the exception is not limited by the means of curing the defect).
144. See id. at 592 n.8 (arguing "[w]e think it evident that Carden decisively adopted an
understanding of the limited partnership as an "entity," rather than an "aggregation" for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction").
145. Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 75 (stating that "considerations of finality, efficiency, and
economy" are "overwhelming"). Compare id. (approving the post-filing cure of defective diversity
on judicial economy grounds in a case where litigants spent three years litigating jurisdiction) with
Grupo, 541 U.S. at 591-82 (calling "wasteful" Atlas's decision to spend two years litigating
jurisdiction rather than re-litigating the merits or negotiating for a settlement with Dataflux).
146. See Leading Cases, supra note 129, at 392 n.50 (opining that "[a]lthough efficiency is
often trotted out to justify procedural decisions.., it does not belong in constitutional contexts").
The author praises Judge Garza's recognition in his Fifth Circuit dissent that a lack of efficiency is a
price of federalism. Id. The author notes that the "checks, balances, and decentralization of
federalism are inherently inefficient." Id. See also Simpson-Wood, supra note 140 at 285 (opining
that the Supreme Court's "disproportionate glorification" of the doctrine of judicial economy "is
undermining the constitutional and statutory commandment that federal courts, as courts of limited
jurisdiction, must have proper subject matter jurisdiction prior to considering the merits of the
case").
147. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 572 (stating that judicial economy "unquestionably provided the ratio
decidendi").
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equating unilateral cure with unilateral citizenship change, and
paradoxically downplaying judicial economy in one case while
embracing it in another, belie the true reason for the majority's position
in this case; its refusal to read any sort of loophole into the bright-line
Carden rule whose true rationale is to limit diversity jurisdiction. 148
B. The ClarifiedScope of the Caterpillar Exception
Some authors predicted before Grupo that the Court would allow
the practicality rationale that evolved in Newman-Green and Caterpillar
to apply beyond the procedural regimes of those cases. 14 9 An article
published shortly after the announcement of the Caterpillar decision
predicted that the judicial economy rationale in that removal case could
150
have a broad impact on diversity jurisdiction beyond removal cases.
Another article interpreted the Caterpillar decision as a "unanimous
promotion of judicial economy over procedural rights."' 5' Despite its
148. See Supreme Court Decisions: Subject Matter Jurisdiction, AALS CIVIL PROCEDURE
SECTION NEWSLETTER (questioning why the majority in Grupo hinged upon the curing method

differences between the facts of Caterpillarand the facts of Grupo). The author continues, "[w]hat
is far less clear is why this should matter, unless one thinks Caterpillarand its predecessors were
wrongly decided or one embraces (for other reasons) the majority's instinct to limit any existing
exceptions to the time-of-filing rule as narrowly as is humanly possible." Id. See also SimpsonWood, supra note 140, at 351 (referring to Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Carden and stating
that "[r]emaining married to this text, it was preordained that there could be no finding that the
jurisdictional flaw that existed at the time-of-filing in Dataflux had been cured"). Simpson-Wood
argued that Justice Scalia used time-of-filing precedent as a "fallback position" in Grupo because of
his bright-line analysis of the limited partnership in Carden as an entity. Id. The author reasoned
that the judicial economy rationale that supported the "questionable outcomes" of both NewmanGreen and Caterpillar "should certainly have been strong enough to salvage jurisdiction in
Dataflux." Id. at 352.
149. See, e.g., Lionel M. Schooler, Keeping up with: The Evolution of Diversity Jurisdiction:
Atlas Global Group, L.P. v Grupo Dataflux, 40 HOUSTON LAWYER 47 (2003) ("The Fifth Circuit
detected in these decisions a common sense approach by the Supreme Court to jurisdictional
issues..."), Mark R. Kravitz, Salvaging Jurisdiction: The Newman-Green Exception Can Be A
Godsend For Those Who Overlooked Or Misunderstood That Pesky Little Issue of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction, 172 NEW JERSEY LAW JOURNAL 725 (2003) (stating that the practicality rationale may
greatly expand the scope of the exception); Engler v. Oprah Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680, 687 (5th Cir.

2000) (stating that [t]he ultimate scope of Caterpillarmay be unclear) quoting 14B, MILLER &
COOPER, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE § 3723, at 588-89 (2d. ed. 1984) (stating that the

Caterpillarexception was "somewhat more contentious and as yet undefined").
150. Chad Mills, Note, Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis: Harmless Error Applied to Removal
Jurisdiction, 35 Hous. L. REV. 601, 617 (1998) ("Applying the Court's reasoning to the complete
diversity requirement, an appellate court could not consider a lack of complete diversity to be a
jurisdictional bar once the litigants have had a full and fair trial on the merits, as any error would be
harmless.").
151. Donna L. Lyons, Recent Development: Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis: Proper Federal Court
JurisdictionAt Time of Judgment Cures an EarlierErroneous Denial of Motion to Remand And
Improperly Removed Case, 27 U. BALT. L.F. 63 (1997) (stating that "based on the trend of judicial
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scathing critique of judicial economy as a rationale, the majority in
Grupo did not disappoint these commentators; while the opinion
reaffirmed the time of filing rule, it also reaffirmed
the exception and
1 52
gave future litigants greater clarity about its scope.
Despite the fact that the end result in Grupo was a failure to apply
the Caterpillarexception to an originally filed case, Dataflux's attempt
to persuade both the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court that the D.C.
Circuit's Saadeh decision correctly limited the scope of the Caterpillar
decision was limited to removal cases failed. 153 When the majority
expressly married the cure in Caterpillarto the cure defined in NewmanGreen, it implicitly agreed with the dissent that the decision did not
depend on the fact that Grupo was an originally filed case. 154 Rather
than a split over removal versus original filing, the real split before
Grupo among lower courts was whether the Caterpillarexception was
available if the court discovered the nondiverse party before
judgment. 155 The majority again resolved this scope question by
economy, one is unsure when the newly established line will move again). See also Thad T. Dmeris
and Michael J. Mucchetti, Vectors to Federal Court. Unique Approaches to Subject Matter
Jurisdiction in Aviation Cases, 62 J. AIR L. & COM. 959, 985 (1997) (opining that the lesson of
Caterpillaris "all's well that ends well").
152. Many commentators now cite Grupo to express the continuing vitality of the time of filing
rule. See, e.g., Don Zupanec, Diversity Jurisdiction- Absence of Diversity- Defect CuredPriorto
Entry of Judgment, 19 No. Federal Litigator 2 (2004); Steve Lash, Diversity must exist when lawsuit
filed, Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, May 18, 2004 at 2. Federal courts that have cited the case thus
far do so to reiterate the time of filing rule, or to support the continuing use of the dismissal process
to retroactively cure incomplete diversity of parties as in Caterpillar. See, e.g., Williams v. Dow
Chemical Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 443 (2004) (holding that the time of filing rule still stands); In re
Bowshier, 313 B.R. 332 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 2004) (holding that Grupo did not prohibit
courts from using Caterpillarto cure diversity via dismissal).
153. See Brief for Appellee Grupo Dataflux at 10, Atlas Global Group, L.P. v. Grupo Dataflux,
312 F.3d 168 (No. 01-20245); Petition for a Writ of Certiorai at X, Grupo, 541 U.S. 567 (No. 021689). The Fifth Circuit declined to follow this reasoning. Atlas, 312 F.3d at 173 (finding Saadeh
unpersuasive because the D.C. Circuit did not provide any rationale for rejecting Caterpillaron the
basis of it being a removal case). Neither the majority nor dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court
in Grupo even mention Saadeh. See also supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Saadeh.
154. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 592-93 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that because removal
jurisdiction based on diversity requires satisfaction of 28 U.S.C. 1332 diversity requirements just as
original filings require there is no distinction based on the method of arriving in federal court). See
also id at 572 (majority opinion) (opining for the majority that Caterpillar"broke new ground"
because the cure, dismissal ofa nondiverse party, had "long been an exception"). The majority then
cited Newman-Green for the proposition that the cure by dismissal method was well established. Id.
Newman-Green was an originally filed case. Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 828. See also supra
notes 45-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of Newman-Green.
155. See supra note 63 (noting that some lower courts distinguished Caterpillaron the ground
that a case had not reached judgment before the defect in diversity was raised). But see All AT&T
Corp. Fiber Optic Pltfs. v. All AT&T Corp. Fiber Optic Defendants, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20026,
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explicitly connecting the cure in Caterpillar to the cure defined 1in
56
Newman-Green, something the Caterpillaropinion itself did not do.
Cure by dismissal under FED. R. Civ. P. 2 1, which is the method used in
Newman-Green and explicitly
approved in Grupo, allows dismissal "at
57
any stage of the action."'
One final clarification that the Court as a whole agreed on
regarding the scope of the Caterpillarexception is that minimal diversity
is required at the time of filing. 158 In this respect, the Court agreed that
the Fifth Circuit version of the exception went too far. 159 Because the
Fifth Circuit would allow constitutional defects, i.e. lack of minimal
diversity, to be cured, it would permit an individual's change of
citizenship to cure diversity, something that both majority
and dissent
0
agreed violated Connoly's "no change of parties" rule.16
One author, who criticized the Court's re-affirmance of the
Caterpillar exception in Grupo, argued that using court-ordered
dismissal of nondiverse parties under FED. R. Civ. P. 21 to cure defects
in diversity after time of filing was a bad idea from its inception that is

at *21-22 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (acknowledging district court cases from the 5th, 9th and 2d circuits that
distinguished Caterpillar on the basis of whether judgment had been entered). This court on the
other hand did not read that limit into Caterpillar and argued that Caterpillar'sreasoning "extends
to district courts even before the formal entry of final judgment." Id. at 23.
156. Compare Grupo, 541 U.S. at 572 (opining for the majority that Caterpillar"broke no new
ground" because the cure, dismissal of a nondiverse party, as noted in Newman-Green, had "long
been an exception") with Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 74 (characterizing Newman-Green as
"instructive" for its practicality rationale).
157. FED. R. CIv.P. 21.
158. Justice Ginsburg pointed out the necessity of minimal diversity explicitly and used it to
develop her limited exception to the Carden precedent. Grupo, 541 U.S. 588 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that in both Caterpillarand Newman-Green minimal diversity was the common
thread). The majority failed to agree with the dissent's argument that Atlas was minimally diverse
under Carden but implicitly agreed that minimal diversity was a requisite to the time of filing
exception. Id.at 579 n.8 (calling complete diversity an "extraconstitutional" requirement). See also
Leading Cases, supra note 129 at 391 (opining that both majority and dissent "treat statutory
requirements for jurisdiction as distinct from constitutional requirements for jurisdiction"). The
author further observes that the majority's distinction of Atlas' diversity defect from Caterpillar's
derived from treating Caterpillar's as statutory and Atlas' as constitutional and holding that statutory
defects were curable after time of filing while constitutional defects were not. Id.
159. The Fifth Circuit exception allowed the curing of both "constitutional" and "statutory"
diversity problems. Atlas, 312 F.3d at 174 (allowing a cure where "an action is filed or removed
when constitutional and/or statutory jurisdictional requirements are not met").
160. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 574 (opining that the Court never allowed a party's post-filing
citizenship change to cure defective diversity). The majority acknowledged that "not even the
dissent suggests that it ought to do so." Id.See also id. at 590 (opining that "[w]hen a sole plaintiff
files suit in federal court... his move to another State manufactures diversity that did not exist even
minimally at the outset").
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antithetical to federalism and separation of powers.' 6' The author
believes that unless Congress expressly grants the judiciary a specific
power, the judiciary should interpret its powers in the subconstitutional
realm of subject matter jurisdiction as restrictively as possible. 162 The
author argued that the Court took for granted an overbroad interpretation
of its power under FED. R. Civ. P. 21 to dismiss parties and should have
63
taken the opportunity in Grupo to reign in that mistaken interpretation.1
But this argument largely parallels Justice Kennedy's dissent in
Newman-Green (a dissent joined by Justice Scalia) that they have since
flatly rejected first by joining the unanimous Caterpillaropinion and
finally by explicitly embracing Newman-Green in Grupo.164 In essence,
161. See Leading Cases, supra note 129 at 386 (arguing that the Grupo Court should have
eliminated the Caterpillarexception). Id. at 390 (arguing that both majority and dissent bickered
over how to cure diversity and "regrettably ignored the threshold question whether, constitutionally,
federal courts can even do so"). The author argued that the Framers' imposed separation of powers
in the Article III requirement that Congress control federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction in
order to prevent "federal courts from usurping the primacy of state courts." Id. at 391.
162. Id. at 391 (arguing that restrictive mistaken interpretations of Congressional intent in the
subconstitutional realm of subject matter jurisdiction are preferable to overbroad ones). When the
Court makes a restrictive mistaken interpretation the litigant may still litigate the state claim in state
court. Id. But when the Court makes an overbroad mistaken interpretation federalism is infringed
because the interpretation "opens federal courts to cases Congress did not intend for them to hear."
Id. The author argues that when Congress is "silent or ambiguous" the Court should dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Leading Cases, supranote 129. See also Simpson-Wood, supra
note 140, at 313 (opining that when the Court validates "retroactive jurisdiction" it is
"impermissibly trespassing into an area constitutionally reserved to Congress"). Simpson-Wood
believe this trespass occurs regardless of whether the Court's rationale is judicial economy or "the
guise of merely setting the parameters of a court-created rule." Id. See also supra note 115 and
accompanying text, describing the subconstitutional arena as that between the Constitution's Article
III grant of power to the Court and Congress' explicit statutory grants of subject matter jurisdiction.
163. Leading Cases, supra note 129, at 392-93 (arguing that "in affirming the judicial practice
of altering parties, which might offend the Rules Enabling Act (REA) ...the Justices usurped
Congress's exclusive power to establish jurisdictional requirements and exceptions"). The author
argued that Congress authorized the judiciary to develop procedural rules under the REA but that
interpreting Rule 21 to enable judges to cure diversity defects makes the Rule nonprocedural. Id.at
393. The author argues this interpretation is nonprocedural because it gives courts "direct and
continued access to the merits when they would not have had it otherwise." Id.
164. See Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 839 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that if Congress
intended to grant the courts the power to cure defective diversity by dismissing nondiverse parties it
would have done so explicitly). The dissent agreed with the majority that 28 U.S.C. § 1653 did not
grant the courts authority to cure defects in diversity only defective allegations of diversity. Id.
Justice Kennedy concluded that because Congress felt the need to explicitly grant this "ministerial"
power, the Court must not presume "the more awesome power" of actual cure in the absence of an
explicit statutory grant. Id. While the key issue of Newman-Green was whether the appellate courts
could use Rule 21 to dismiss nondiverse parties, Justices Kennedy and Scalia took the opportunity
to attack even the district courts' ability to use Rule 21 in this fashion. Id. The dissenting justices
attacked the judicial economy rationale for interpreting Rule 21 to apply to appellate courts. Id. at
842-43. But see Caterpillar,519 U.S. at 73 (stating that "[b]eyond question.., there was in this
case complete diversity, and therefore federal subject-matter jurisdiction, at the time of trial and

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

31

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 21 [2006], Art. 4
AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[21:165

this author proposes a much more extreme view of the Court's ability to
fashion subconstitutional subject matter jurisdiction doctrine than the
entire Court itself; while the Court was heavily divided in Grupo, it
remains united in its opinion that it has the power to use FED. R. CIV. P.
21 to dismiss nondiverse parties after time of filing to "create" complete
diversity. 165
After Grupo, future litigants have a brighter path to the Caterpillar
exception; the entire Court rightly agreed that it is a valid exception to
the time of filing rule. 166 As it stands, the exception is available in both
originally filed and removed cases where there are enough parties to
have minimal diversity at the time of filing and the non-diverse parties
are dispensable.1 67 However, this clarification of Caterpillar'sscope,
while a positive outcome for individual and corporate litigants in multiparty actions, comes with a negative; the majority of the Court reaffirmed the unworkable Carden rule, the application of which was at
the heart of Atlas' defeat.1 68 The next section of this Note analyzes why
the majority of the Court remains loyal to Carden and why it must be
overruled or limited. 169
C. Carden 's ContinuingEffect
If limited partnerships were treated the same way as corporations
for citizenship determination, there would have been no jurisdictional
dispute here, yet Atlas failed to challenge this "line in the sand" case and
its continuing barrier to diversity jurisdiction for partnerships and other
unincorporated business associations.1 70 The majority's refusal to heed
judgment"). The district court dismissed the nondiverse party under FED. R. Civ.P. 21. Id.at 66.
See also Grupo, 541 U.S. at 573 (stating that Caterpillar "involved an unremarkable application" of
the "established" exception of dismissal by Rule 21 to cure defective diversity). Justice Scalia
quoted Newman-Green approvingly. Id.
165. This agreement does not contradict their concern for expanding caseloads. See Grupo,
541 U.S. at 597 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that "no wave of new jurisdictional litigation is
likely, as the federal courts' experience after Caterpillar and Newman-Green shows"). The
majority criticized the Fifth Circuit exception as likely to create more litigation because it viewed
that exception as distinct from Caterpillar. Id. at 581 (majority opinion).
166. But see Leading Cases, supra note 129 at 386 (opining that the Court should have used
Grupo to eliminate the Caterpillar exception entirely on the basis of "principles of federalism and
separation of powers").
167. See supra notes 104-11 for a discussion of the scope of the Caterpillarexception as
clarified in Grupo.
168. See supra notes 131-48 for a discussion of why Carden and not Caterpillar was
dispositive to Atlas' case.
169. See infra notes 170-91 and accompanying text.
170. Compare Knop, 872 F.2d at 1138 (holding one year before Carden that when non-diverse
partners left a partnership post-removal but before trial and judgment, diversity was cured and the
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Justice Ginsburg's call to modify this subconstitutional precedent in
light of its impracticality is the subject of this section.' 7 1
Many commentators, including the Carden majority itself, criticize
the Carden decision as an arbitrary decision justified on the surface, just
as Grupo was, by reliance on precedent and deference to Congress.' 72
These commentators argue that had the Carden majority examined the
way a modem limited partnership works, as the dissent did, it would find
that determining citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction on
whether an entity is incorporated or not is a distinction out of touch with
modem business organizations. 173 The Carden majority's perceived
judgment could stand) with Belleville Catering Co. v. Champaign Marketplace, LLC, 350 F.3d 691,
692 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying the Carden rule and dismissing a district court judgment in a case
with a non-diverse limited liability corporation as a party. "Unincorporated enterprises are
analogized to partnerships, which take the citizenship of every general and limited partner.").
171. See infra notes 172-87.
172. See Carden, 494 U.S. at 196 (characterizing the decision as "technical, precedent-bound,
and unresponsive to policy considerations raised by the changing realities of business
organizations"). The majority then conceded that limited partnerships are "functionally similar" to
corporations and that "considerations of basic fairness and substance over form require that limited
partnerships receive similar treatment" under diversity jurisdiction. Id. (internal quotations
omitted). See also Capra, supra note 133 at 654 (opining that Justice Scalia in Carden illustrated
his practice of using arguments grounded in tradition to push for limits on judicial activism); Porter,
supra note 15 at 296-97 (opining that the precedent used to justify counting all members of a
limited partnership is a "logical syllogism based on strict definitional analysis" and epitomizes
"form over substance reasoning"). Porter explains that the Court reasoned that limited partnerships
fell within the precedents of Chapman, GreatSouthern Fire, Russell, and Bouligny simply because
those cases dealt with unincorporated associations, and a limited partnership is an unincorporated
association. Id. See supra note 38 regarding the four cases relied on by the Carden majority. See
also Simpson-Wood, supra note 140 at 332 (opining that in Carden "the Court turned a blind eye to
the realities of today's business world").
173. See Carden, 494 U.S. at 198 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority, under
the guise of deferring to Congress, actually created a "newly formulated rule that the Court will,
without analysis of the particular entity before it, count every member of an unincorporated
association for purposes of diversity jurisdiction"). Justice O'Connor examined the entities
involved in Chapman (joint stock company), Great Southern Fire (limited partnership association),
Russell (sociedad en comandita), and Bouligny (labor union) in comparison with a modem limited
partnership organized according to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1969) and agreed with
commentators that limited partners of a limited partnership should not be counted towards the
citizenship for diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 202-06 (citing Comment, Limited Partnerships and
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction,45 U.CHI.L.REv. 384 (1978), Note, Who Are the Real Parties in
Interest for Purposes of Determining Diversity Jurisdiction for Limited Partnerships?, 61
WASH.U.L.Q. 1051 (1984), Note, Diversity Jurisdiction over UnincorporatedBusiness Entities:
The Real Partyin Interest as a JurisdictionalRule, 56 TEXAS L. REV. 243 (1978)). Justice Scalia's
only counter-argument to the dissent's in-depth analysis was that the analysis was based on
scholarly commentary rather than the text of the four precedents. Carden, 494 U.S. at 195. See also
Oh, supra note 31, at 392 (opining that the Court relied on path dependence rather than business
realities that no longer justify distinct treatment of limited partnerships and corporations under the
diversity statute); McCormack, supra note 32, at 556 n.440 (noting that Porter's analysis of modem
limited partnerships concludes they are "pseudo-corporations"). See Porter, supra note 15, at 301-
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deference to Congress was likely more motivated by the desire to curtail
diversity jurisdiction caseloads than by simple judicial restraint.174 It is
likely that the Carden majority was influenced by the Federal Courts
Study Commission's recommendation to abolish or severely curtail
diversity jurisdiction. 7 5 These recommendations heralded the possibility
that Congress would rescue the courts from their caseload problems by
getting rid of this area of jurisdiction that many on the Court wish to see
eliminated.1 76 Carden was a bright signal from the Court to Congress

03 (arguing that modem limited partnerships are "pseudo-corporations" deserving of the same
treatment under the diversity statute as corporations). Porter compared the Unified Limited
Partnership Act and Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act to the Model Business Corporation
Act and opined that limited partnerships are "pseudo-corporations" because 1) like a corporation
they must file with the state in order to exist, 2) limited partners' ability to participate in the
workings of the business are more limited than those of a corporate shareholder, 3) limited
partnerships may be considered securities under federal law, and 4) limited partners cannot sue or
be sued for the organization. Id. Porter concludes that, "[t]he generic category of unincorporated
association, while still befitting such single class entities as unions, general partnerships and joint
stock companies, is not appropriate for modem, national-scope, dual class, limited partnerships
when determining diversity jurisdiction." Id. at 306-07. But see Szypszak, supra note 72, at 22
(countering Porter's analysis and concluding that corporations deserve distinct treatment based on
investor expectations). Szypszak argues that despite the similarities, limited partnerships and
corporations are "clearly distinct investment options." Id. at 26. The author focuses on the
differences in tax treatment and opines that a limited partnership loses its "flow-through" tax
treatment if it takes on too many corporate characteristics. Id. at 25-26.
174. Carden,494 U.S. at 207 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (opining that the implicit rationale for
the majority's holding was that "failure to consider the citizenship of all the members of an
unincorporated business association will expand diversity jurisdiction at a time when our federal
courts are already seriously overburdened"). See also Larry E. Ribstein, Essay: Preparingthe
Corporate Lawyer: Corporations or Business Associations? The Wisdom and Folly of an
Integrated Course, 34 GA. L. REv. 973, 984 (2000) (opining that "erosion of distinctions between
corporations and partnerships" makes Carden "look more like a way to limit its caseload than one
compelled by the essential nature of corporations and partnerships").
175. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (explaining that the Federal Courts Study
Committee recommendations were intended to lessen caseloads). One of the Committee's "backup"
recommendations was to curtail corporate access to diversity jurisdiction by including in their
citizenship every state in which they are licensed to do business. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE, supra note 73 at 42. This recommendation for a comprehensive refocusing of
diversity jurisdiction signaled a retreat from an earlier movement to expand diversity jurisdiction for
unincorporated associations. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 70, at 114 (recommending
that partnerships be deemed citizens for diversity jurisdiction purposes of the state where it has its
principal place of business). The ALl noted that its recommendation came as the Court decided in
Bouligny to count every member of an unincorporated association towards the association's
citizenship. Id. at 116. However, because the Bouligny Court based its reason for the opinion on
deference to Congress, the ALl gleaned that "[t]o whatever extent any view on the ultimate merits
may be extracted from the opinion, it would be a suggestion in the direction of revision of the kind
proposed herein." Id.
176. See supra note 129 (opining that the judiciary opposes diversity jurisdiction);
McCormack, supra note 32, at 559 (noting that former Chief Justice Rehnquist was "among
diversity jurisdiction's most notable and staunchest opponents"). McCormack examined a number
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that the Court
is committed to severely curtailing diversity
177
jurisdiction.
Grupo illustrates and reaffirms the barrier to diversity jurisdiction
facing limited partnerships since the Court in Carden refused to extend
them citizenship for diversity purposes analogous to corporations under
28 U.S.C. 1332(c). 178 Commentators recognize that this unworkable rule
extends beyond limited partnerships and negatively affects other
"pseudo-corporate" unincorporated associations such as limited liability
companies. 179 The practical effects of Carden on these entities, which
the Court in Grupo reaffirmed, are numerous. tS8 These commentators
of Rehnquist's Year-End Reports on the Federal Judiciary to support this proposition. Id. n.457.
McCormack quoted Rehnquist's 1987 Year-End Report:
It is not clear that the need for diversity jurisdiction is as strong today as it may have
been in the past. In a time of budgetary austerity when the federal judiciary must find
ways to economize on its resources, the elimination of diversity jurisdiction would result
in significant savings .... I believe that the elimination or curtailment of diversity
jurisdiction is an idea that merits serious consideration.
Id. quoting Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, U.S. Supreme Court, 1987 Year-End Report on the
Judiciary 7 (Dec. 1987).
177.

See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE

FEDERAL COURTS, 30 (Dec. 1995) availableat http://www.uscourts.govlrp/index.html (last visited
May 11, 2006) (characterizing diversity jurisdiction as "a massive diversion of federal judge power
away from their principal function - adjudicating criminal cases and civil cases based on federal
law").
The Judicial Conference recommended that Congress at a minimum adopt the
recommendations of the 1990 Federal Courts Study Commission. Id. at 32.
178. Carden, 494 U.S. at 197 ("We have long decided that, having established special
treatment for corporations, we will leave the rest to Congress; we adhere to that decision."); see also
Carter G. Bishop and Daniel S. Kleinberger, Diversity Jurisdictionfor LLCs? Basically Forget
About It, 14 BUSINESS LAW TODAY 1, 31, 33 (2004) (stating that Grupo reconfirmed the Carden
rule for determining citizenship of unincorporated entities).
179. See Debra R. Cohen, Citizenship of Limited Liability Companies for Diversity
Jurisdiction,6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 435, 436 n.2 (2001) quoting Int'l Flavors & Textures,
LLC v. Garner, 966 F. Supp. 552, 553 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (describing members of a limited liability
company as similar to shareholders of a corporation because they do not face personal liability for
corporate debt). The distinction between corporate shareholders and limited liability company
members is that profits and losses flow directly to members. Id. See also Bishop and Kleinberger,
supra note 178 at 35 (explaining that "Carden dictates that, when federal diversity is the issue,
LLCs are treated like any other unincorporated business organization"). Bishop and Kleinberger
examined case law and found that since 1996, "every reported decision at both the district and
circuit court levels has acknowledged that Carden controls." Id.
180. See Bishop and Kleinberger, supra note 178 at 35 (listing effects of Carden on LLCs in
particular but which apply to limited partnerships such as Atlas as well). The authors state that
because Carden requires courts to count all members of an unincorporated association in the
citizenship equation the practical consequence is:
In any suit between an LLC and a third party (that is, not a member), diversity
jurisdiction depends on the citizenship of each LLC member at the time the lawsuit is
filed
In any suit between an LLC and a member, diversity jurisdiction is impossible
In an LLC-related suit among members of an LLC, diversity jurisdiction depends on
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call for one of two sweeping reforms from either the Court or Congress:
1) treat the citizenship of limited partnerships and limited liability
companies like corporations for purposes of diversity, 181 or 2) adopt the
real parties to the controversy test embraced by Justice O'Connor in
Carden.'82 In light of the breadth of these proposed reforms, Justice
whether the LLC is an indispensable party (even assuming the litigating members are
diverse)
In any derivative lawsuit brought on behalf of an LLC, diversity jurisdiction depends on
the citizenship of each LLC member at the time the lawsuit is filed and is impossible in
all but very limited circumstances.
Id. See also Porter, supra note 15, at 289 (opining that Carden "prevents matters of national
concern from being adjudicated in a national forum" because the rule arbitrarily "bars nationalscope limited partnerships from federal courts"). Oh opines that there are "hidden costs" to the
Carden test for unincorporated citizenship. Oh, supra note 31 at 468. See infra notes 170-91 and
accompanying text 3 1, at 468 (arguing that "ascertaining the citizenship of all members of an
unincorporated association is a cumbersome and potentially expensive proposition"). As the scope
of an unincorporated association grows geographically, another particularly vexing problem arises
from Carden because of the "statelessness rule" of alienage jurisdiction. See supra note 47 and
accompanying text (discussing the statelessness rule). Commentators note that many large
unincorporated associations are able to completely avoid being subjected to diversity-based
litigation in federal court by having a single, U.S. citizen-member domiciled abroad. See Levinson,
supra note 129 at 1424 (spotting this trend particularly in large law firms with foreign branches);
Robert J. Tribeck, Cracking the Doctrinal Wall of Chapman v. Barney: A New Diversity Testfor
Limited Partnershipsand Limited Liability Companies, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 89, 98 n.39 (1995)
(explaining that this "'back door' out of federal court" for large partnerships with international
offices creates the same concern "the legal profession envisioned large corporations exploiting after
the Court's decision in Deveaux" and likely influenced the Court's decision to reverse Deveaux in
Letson and establish citizenship for corporations). Tribeck sees this "back door" being used not
only in large law firms but also in large accounting firms. Id. See also Oh, supra note 31, at 460
(opining that unincorporated associations "can control when and where they wish to deprive
themselves or adverse litigants of access to federal courts" by making sure there are some
"stateless" members). Oh continues that this "undesirable forum shopping" is analogous to the
activities that prompted Congress to statutorily define and limit the judicially created corporate
citizenship doctrine in 1958. Id. See also supra note 31 and accompanying text discussing the
development of corporate diversity citizenship.
181. See, e.g., Oh, supra note 31, at 470 (advocating a principal place of business test);
McCormack, supra note 32, at 557 (advocating entity status for limited partnerships); Porter, supra
note 15 at 304 (advocating state of organization and principal place of business test for limited
partnerships); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 70, at 114 (advocating a principal place of
business test). Some commentators recommend more detailed legislative proposals that would grant
such status to limited partnerships and limited liability companies, because of their near-corporate
status, but maintain the "all members" test for other unincorporated associations. See, e.g., Tribeck,
supra note 180 at 121 (advocating a multi-factor test for treating limited liability companies and
limited partnerships like corporations). Tribeck would grant entity status to organizations with four
of the five following characteristics: "(i) limited liability for members; (ii) required filing of
organizational documents by a state; (iii) lack of free transferability of interest; (iv) lack of
centralized management; and (v) lack of continuity of life." Id.
182. Carden, 494 U.S. at 198 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor argued that
analysis of who in a limited partnership is a real party to the controversy, or "which parties have
control over the subject of and litigation over the controversy" led her to conclude that only general
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Ginsburg's proposal in Grupo to read a minimal diversity exception into
Carden limited to the time of filing rule seems like a sensible and
narrow exception to the general rule.' 83 The majority's refusal to bend
partners should be counted toward a limited partnership's citizenship. Id. This may explain why
Justice O'Connor voted with the majority in Grupo - because there was question whether all of
Atlas' general partners were in fact diverse from Dataflux. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 585 n.1 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (noting that one of Atlas' general partners, a Texas limited liability company,
included Mexican members). Justice Ginsburg noted that the Court had never explicitly applied
Carden to a limited liability company but the Courts of Appeals had. Id. See also supra note 179
and accompanying text (noting that the Courts of Appeals have applied Carden to limited liability
companies). McCormack questioned "[w]hether Justice O'Connor would have proceeded.., had a
general partner, instead of a limited partner, been nondiverse" under the facts of Carden.
McCormack, supra note 32, at 549 n.393. See also Cohen, supra note 179, at 472 (advocating the
real party to the controversy test). Cohen would revise 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) to remove express
references to specific types of business organizations because the corporate/non-corporate
dichotomy is based on outdated views of such organizations. Id. at 473. Instead, Cohen would
revise the statute to determine "the citizenship of a business organization" based on who has "direct
interest in the litigation" meaning, who is "personally liable for the judgment in the event the
litigation is decided against the business organization." Id. Under this revision of the statute,
corporations and not shareholders would have the direct interest, general partners and not limited
partners would have a direct interest, and a limited liability company and not the members would
have a direct interest. Id. at 474. But see Hedwig M. Auletta, Including Limited Partners in the
DiversityJurisdictionAnalysis, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 607, 627-28 (1986) (criticizing the real parties
to the controversy test because it requires an in-depth factual inquiry). Auletta argues that the test
would create inconsistencies because one could challenge whether a limited partner exerted enough
control to warrant being considered a general partner. Id. If this occurs at the appellate level, the
court is at a deficit because it may not have sufficient facts on the record to make a decision. Id.
See also Szypszak, supra note 72, at 17 (criticizing the real parties to the controversy test as "overly
burdensome and analytically unnecessary if a clear distinction can be made based on the choice of
organizational form").
183. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 589 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the holding of Carden
as requiring the citizenship of all partners, general and limited, to be counted toward a limited
partnership's citizenship). Justice Ginsburg did not dispute the applicability of the general rule
itself only the majority's characterization of the partnership in Carden as an entity rather than an
aggregate capable of curing diversity after the time of filing. Id. at 591 n.6. See also Knop, 872 F.
2d at 1138 (applying the general rule later applied in Carden in a factually similar case but allowing
nondiverse partners who left after time of filing to cure diversity on judicial economy grounds).
The distinction between the majority and dissent in Grupo over Carden was not over the rule itself,
but over Justice Scalia's statement that "[w]e think it evident that Carden decisively adopted an
understanding of the limited partnership as an "entity," rather than an "aggregation," for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction." Grupo, 541 U.S. at 579 n.8 citing Carden, 494 U.S. at 188 n.l ("[tihere are
not, as the dissent assumes, multiple respondents before the Court, but only one: the artificial entity
called Arkoma Associates, a limited partnership."). McCormack argues that this was a new
characterization slipped into the footnote of Carden, stating that when Justice Scalia made the
"unequivocal statement that a limited partnership, as entity, was the party who prosecuted this
dispute and stood before the Court," he "incontrovertibly recognized that an unincorporated
organization was an entity separate and distinct from its constituent members." McCormack, supra
note 32, at 546. McCormack opines that the foundational precedents of Chapman, Great Southern
Fire,and Bouligny relied on in Carden "ignored or glossed over" this concept and simply focused
on the issue of whether the entities in question were corporations or not. Id. McCormack further
opined that when Justice Scalia adopted this "entity-as-entity" approach to the limited partnership's
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highlights the Court's continued desire to limit diversity jurisdiction at
all costs-the dissent's interpretation threatened to weaken the "line in
the sand" to Congress that the Court drew in 1990.184
Congress' failure to take action in the fifteen years since the Court
deferred in Carden is unsurprising given the lobbying pressures it faces
to retain diversity jurisdiction.' 85 If Congress will not act to remedy this
acknowledged unfair disparity between corporations and unincorporated
entities, the Court should end its stubborn refusal to craft a solution and
use one of the many possible solutions commentators have developed to
solve the problem judicially. 186 The Court is not required to defer to
Congress in this subconstitutional arena, nor should it do187so in an effort
to backhandedly encourage Congress to lessen caseloads.
citizenship, he deviated from the Chapman line of precedent and should have examined the
underlying essence of the limited partnership as was done in the Letson line of cases that determined
that corporations deserved entity-citizenship status. Id. at 547. Justice Ginsburg and the dissent in
Grupo recognized this weakness in Carden and attempted to fashion a narrow exception to that case
for minimally diverse limited partnerships to achieve complete diversity after the time of filing on
judicial economy grounds as Caterpillar endorsed. Grupo, 541 U.S. at 588-89 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
184. See supra notes 131-48 arguing that Carden and its underlying purpose to limit diversity
jurisdiction was the key influence in the Grupo decision.
185. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the debate over the
future of diversity jurisdiction. See also Kramer supra note 72, at 98-99 (opining that Congress'
inaction on diversity jurisdiction is largely the result of lobbying by trial lawyers and the American
Bar Association); See also supra note 180 (discussing how large firms are taking advantage of the
Carden rule to insulate themselves against federal diversity-based litigation). It is possible that this
powerful legal lobby has Congress right where it wants it.
186. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the possible reforms to
the Carden rule.
187. See supra note 124 and accompanying text explaining that the Court has discretion in the
subconstitutional arena between constitutional text and statutes. See also Daniel J. Meltzer, The
Supreme Court'sJudicialPassivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REv. 343, 343 (2002) (opining that the Court has
tried to take a passive approach and restrict judicial lawmaking rather than "take responsibility for
shaping a workable legal system"). Meltzer examined the Court's deference to Congress in
numerous areas of law and concluded that this is not the best approach because Congress often
leaves statutory ambiguity in order to gain consensus. Id. at 387. Additionally, Congress is often
unable to plan for uncertainties that may arise in litigation. Id. Rather than taking the lead in areas
such as subject matter jurisdiction, where the Court has the experience, Meltzer argues that the
Court's deference to Congress is often "likely to be less successful than leaving matters to be
worked out by judicial decision. Id. at 396. The Court in Carden argued deference to Congress
because Congress had not expanded the diversity statute to include limited partners after it amended
the statute to consider corporations. Carden, 494 U.S. at 196-97. Many commentators criticize the
Carden majority's rationale for its judicial passivity as historically inaccurate. See, e.g., Oh, supra
note 31, at 397 (opining that Congress did not consider whether unincorporated associations should
be given the same treatment as corporations in the 1958 amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because
unincorporated associations were "a relatively insignificant part of the economy"). See also Cohen,
supra note 179, at 466 (criticizing the Court's inference that Congress intentionally excluded
unincorporated associations from the amendment because these entities "were not particularly
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V. CONCLUSION

The Court in Grupo wasted an opportunity to reform diversity
a
jurisdiction for unincorporated associations by either carving out 88
modest exception or completely abolishing the arbitrary Carden rule.
The close split in the opinion indicates that some members of the Court
recognize the growing dissatisfaction among commentators with the
rule's incompatibility with modem business realities.1 89 One positive
aspect to come out of Grupo was that the entire Court reaffirmed a
sound, albeit narrow exception to the time of filing rule. 190 However,
because the Court is so committed to using the Carden rule as a
bargaining chip with Congress in the debate over the future of diversity
jurisdiction, this small win for common sense is little consolation to
Atlas and other unincorporated entities who continue to face dim
prospects to attaining diversity jurisdiction because they have no such
workaround to the Cardenbright line.
Amy Friedmann

popular in 1958 and, consequently, were not invoking diversity with the frequency of
corporations"). Cohen notes that in 1957 more than three thousand cases were filed by corporations
but only two were filed involving either a limited partnership, business trust or joint stock company
as a party. Id. at 466 n. 196. See supranotes 174-77 discussing the Court's desire to abolish or limit

diversity jurisdiction in order to lessen its caseloads; Donald R. Doemberg, There's No Reason for
It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal
Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 654 (1987) quoting Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction
and Recent Attacks Upon It, 18 A.B.A. J.433, 438 (1932) ("It is unthinkable that that sovereignty

should shirk its responsibility and abdicate its proper functions because of a comparatively
insignificant matter of expense.").
188.
189.
190.

See supra notes 181-83 discussing various ways to reform Carden.
See supra notes 171-87 discussing commentators' critiques of Carden.
See supra notes 149-68 discussing how Grupo clarified Caterpillar'sscope.
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